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THE ABIDING PROBLEM
OF WITNESS STATEMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS
MEGAN A. FAIRLIE*
Recent amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the
International Criminal Court (ICC or "Court") give Trial Chambers the
discretion to admit unexamined, party-generated witness statements in lieu
of live testimony. The use of this evidence-which undermines the right of
confrontation and prevents judges from independently assessing witness
credibility-is now a hotly contested issue in each of the Court's ongoing
trials. As ICC judges grapple with the thorny question of how to implement
these new provisions without undermining the right to a fair trial, this Arti-
cle-which is the first to examine the rule amendments and their early im-
plementation-looks to the history of international criminal justice for an-
swers. It traces the tension between more efficient written testimony and the
importance of assuring procedural fairness from Nuremberg and Tokyo
through the present day. It focuses on the experience of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), whose rules served as
a model for the ICC revisions, and it analyzes each of the rules imported
from the ICTY from adoption to application. Through thorough analysis of
ICTY and ICC precedent, this Article identifies the fairness concerns that
ought to shape the Court's implementation of its recently revised rule, and
highlights instances wherein the ICC has already fallen short of the mark.
The goal of this Article is to prompt the international legal community
to revisit its tacit acceptance of ICTY practice as imitable precedent. This
can lead to a debate that prompts more careful consideration of and seeks
out fairness-enhancing alternatives to, this controversial type of evidence.
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PROBLEM OF WITNESS STATEMENTS
"That which has been is what will be, that which is done is
what will be done, and there is nothing new under the
sun."
"No one knows what a witness is going to say at trial before
they take the stand. We have an idea of what our witness[es]
are going to say, and that's why we've decided that we're
going to call them, but witnesses can and often do change
their accounts on the stand and depart from prior state-
ments, and that's obviously one of the reasons why we have
trials at all. '2
I. INTRODUCTION
In November 2013, the Assembly of States Parties of the
International Criminal Court3 (ICC or "Court") adopted the
first-ever amendments to the Court's Rules of Procedure and
Evidence (RPE).4 Among the changes was a major revision of
ICC Rule 68, a provision that initially made the introduction of
prior recorded testimony dependent upon the safeguard of
cross-examination.5 In its stead lies a new rule that makes it
easier to admit the statements of absent witnesses in lieu of live
testimony.6
At first blush, this change may seem a welcome develop-
ment for a Court that has produced only a handful of convic-
tions in more than a decade of operation, and whose work has
1. Ecclesiastes 1:9.
2. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Transcript of Sta-
tus Conference, 39 (June 12, 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Transcripts/
CR2012_06729.PDF (noting remarks of Sam Lowery, Trial Lawyer in the Of-
fice of the Prosecutor).
3. Created pursuant to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
4. Int'l Criminal Court [ICC], Resolution ICC-ASP/12/Res. 7: Amendments
to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, (Nov. 27, 2013) [hereinafter ICC 2013
Amendments].
5. Int'l Criminal Court [ICC], RuLEs OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, Rule
68(a)-(b), ICC-ASP/1/3 (2002) (requiring, for the purpose of admission
under the original rules, either that the opposing party had an opportunity
to examine the witness at the time of recording or that the witness was pre-
sent and available for examination). For the reader's convenience, "ICC
RPE" will be used to refer to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
ICC, with specific versions of the rules noted accordingly.
6. ICC RPE, Rule 68(2)(b)-(d), ICC-PIDS-LT-02-002/13_Eng (2013).
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been repeatedly thwarted by witness tampering. Moreover, the
revised rule might appear instantly credible because it essen-
tially replicates the established practice of the ICC's predeces-
sor court, the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY or "Tribunal").7 Yet, the brief history
of international criminal justice-including the experience of
the ICTY-belies this rosy view of revised Rule 68. Rather, it
reveals that attempts to expedite and streamline international
criminal trials by replacing oral evidence with written state-
ments is a risky maneuver at best.
With an eye towards preserving the ICC's normative and
sociological legitimacy,8 this Article argues that, despite the ap-
parent appeal of the new rule, it ought to be used both spar-
ingly and with caution. The analysis herein utilizes the exper-
iences of the post-WWII Tribunals and the ICTY to identify
and explain the reputational, truth-seeking, and efficiency
costs of admitting party-generated witness statements in inter-
national criminal trials. It demonstrates why the lessons from
these courts are directly relevant to the ICC, and analyzes each
of the rules imported from the ICTY from adoption to applica-
tion. Through thorough analysis of Tribunal and ICC prece-
dent, this Article identifies the fairness concerns that ought to
shape the Court's implementation of revised Rule 68 and
highlights instances wherein the Court has already fallen short
of the mark.
Part II considers the liberal use of written evidence at the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials that were conducted after the
Second World War. This section then explores the fairness im-
plications of using such evidence in adversarial proceedings as
opposed to judge-led investigations and trials. Most signifi-
7. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Com-
mitted in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, May 25, 1993,
32 I.L.M. 1159 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
8. Normative legitimacy requires one to ask "whether there are good
reasons why [an institution] should have the right to make the decisions it
does." Daniel Bodansky, Legitimacy, in T-E OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF INT'L
ENvrL. L. 704, 709 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007). Perceived or sociolog-
ical legitimacy is equally important, as "multilateral institutions will only
thrive if they are viewed as legitimate by democratic publics." Allen
Buchanan & Robert 0. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institu-
tions, 20 ETmics & INT'L Ave. 405, 407 (2006).
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cantly, it demonstrates why party-driven evidence production
renders an opponent's ability to effectively test such evidence a
prerequisite to a fair trial. Part III traces the history of witness
statements at the ICTY, establishing how the drive for effi-
ciency ultimately eradicated the Tribunal's initially strong
preference for live testimony. Part IV considers the ICTY's ini-
tial shift towards increased admission of written evidence. This
section highlights how the Tribunal's adversarial construct
contributed to the concerns that accompanied this change,
and demonstrates why-despite ostensible framework differ-
ences-these concerns apply with equal effect at the ICC.
Parts V-VIII critique, respectively, each of the ICTY Rules that
were recently adopted by the ICC. Each of these parts identi-
fies the problems the rules presented in Tribunal practice,
tracks the early implementation of their ICC analogues, and
identifies instances wherein ICC practice has replicated-or
appears poised to replicate-Tribunal missteps. In its conclu-
sion, the Article contends that the proper way forward, both in
terms of fairness and legitimacy, is for the Court to impose
careful limits on the use of written testimony.
II. PRIOR RECORDED STATEMENTS IN THE PosT-WWII
PROCEEDINGS
A. Written Witness Statements at Nuremberg
The conflict between the time-consuming process of in-
troducing live witness testimony and the desire to make inter-
national prosecutions efficient reaches back as far as the Inter-
national Military Tribunal (IMT) proceedings at Nuremberg. 9
In the lead up to these post-WWII prosecutions, U.S. Prosecu-
tor Robert Jackson argued that admitting sworn written state-
ments was absolutely imperative "if we are to make progress
with this case."10 At the same time, Jackson implicitly recog-
9. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat.
1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
10. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALs 242
(1992) (quoting Jackson). Jackson went on to note: "I think that the Tribu-
nal should receive affidavits, and we have prepared them-we hope care-
fully, we hope fairly-to present a great many things that would take days
and days of proof." 3 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTER-
NATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: PROCEEDINGS VOLUMES (THE BLUE SET) 543
(1945), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/12-14-45.asp.
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nized the dangers of such evidence and limited his proposal to
affidavits "which were not directed against any individual de-
fendant."" Because the IMT was not bound by technical rules
of evidence,12 its judges enjoyed great discretion on the matter
and, ultimately, affidavit evidence proved "both extensive and
important."1 3 While no definitive rule ever emerged regarding
affidavit admissibility,14 this type of evidence was generally ac-
cepted and, in some cases, admitted without the test of cross-
examination.15
In light of the fact that more than 300,000 affidavits were
successfully introduced over the course of the eight-month
trial,1 6 there can be little doubt that the use of written evi-
dence enhanced the efficiency of IMT proceedings. The most
notable cost for this gain, however, was the negative effect this
type of evidence had on the perceived fairness of the trial and
11. TAYLOR supra note 10, at 241 (providing that despite this limitation,
the defense should retain the right to call the affiants for questioning).
12. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 9, art. 19. The Charter also requires
the Tribunal to take judicial notice of "the reports of the United Nations,
including the acts and documents of the committees set up in various Allied
countries for the investigation of war crimes." Id. art. 21. Notably, these doc-
uments included testimony taken by State commissions regarding the Nazi
atrocities. Patricia M. Wald, To "Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence":
The Use of Affidavit Testimony in the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings,
42 HARv. INf'L L.J. 535, 538 (2001).
13. Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evi-
dence: Nuremberg Tokyo, The Hague and Arusha, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
725, 749 (1999).
14. TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 243. Previously in the work, Taylor noted
that the relevant rulings regarding affidavit admissibility seemed inconsis-
tent. Id. at 242.
15. Robert Jackson, Some Problems Developing an International Legal System,
22 TEMP. L.Q. 147, 150 (1948) (acknowledging that affidavits were some-
times admitted even when made by persons unavailable for cross-examina-
tion). See also Wald, supra note 12, at 539 (noting that, ordinarily, affidavits
were admitted with the right of cross examination or, alternatively, written
interrogatories).
16. Heydecker and Leeb assert that the Tribunal "checked 300,000 sworn
statements." JOE J. HEYDECKER & JOHANNEs LEEB, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 94
(1962). While this figure seems high, it is found in multiple sources, includ-
ing the writing of Nuremberg prosecutor Henry King. See, e.g., Henry T.
King, Jr., Robert H. Jackson and the Triumph ofJustice at Nuremberg, 35 CASE W.
REs. J. INT'L L. 263, 270 (2003). Notably, the figure encompasses all submis-
sions (both prosecution and defense).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
80 [Vol. 50:75
PROBLEM OF WITNESS STATEMENTS
the subsequent criticism the practice engendered.17 In fact,
the value of the ex parte affidavits remains contested to this day,
both because they included leading questionsI8 and because
their use, in some cases, "seriously undermine [d] the rights of
the defendants to confront the witnesses against them."' 9 As
Jackson's assistant, Telford Taylor, later acknowledged,
"[t]otal reliance on . . . untested depositions by unseen wit-
nesses is certainly not the most reliable road to factual accu-
racy" and "deliberate exaggeration must have warped many of
the reports." 20 Consequently, and consistent with the effective
use of cross-examination to expose false (live) witness testi-
mony in the same trial,21 the IMT's decision to admit untested
affidavit evidence stands out as a procedural shortcoming,
even if the Nuremberg experiment is generally viewed as hav-
ing been fair overall.22
B. Written Witness Statements at Tokyo
The use of untested written evidence proved even more
problematic at the IMT's companion tribunal, the Interna-
17. See Michael P. Scharf, A Critique of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal,
13 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305, 363 (1997) (averring that pro-prosecution
rulings allowing for the admission of affidavit testimony restricted the due
process guarantees of defendants, particularly in instances where the affiants
were available to testify but were not called).
18. May & Wierda, supra note 13, at 751.
19. Scharf, supra note 17, at 309.
20. TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 315 (indicating that the affidavits likely con-
tained "faulty observation" as well). Accused Rudolf Hess's prepared state-
ment went further, charging that some of the affidavits were forged. NOR-
BERT EHRENFREUND, THE NUREMBERG LEGACY: HOW THE NAzI WAR CRIMES
TRIALS CHANGED THE COURSE OF HISTORY 85 (2007).
21. See, e.g., ANDREW DEWAR GIBB, PERJURY UNLIMITED: A MONOGRAPH ON
NUREMBERG 17-20 (1954) (providing numerous examples of lies exposed
through cross-examination).
22. See, e.g., Antonia Sherman, Sympathy for the Devil: Examining a Defen-
dant's Right to Confront Before the International War Crimes Tribunal, 10 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 833, 865 (1996) (describing the contents of the affidavits as
"largely cumulative"). See also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMAN-
nry: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION 153-54 (2011)
(expressing a similar view about the overall fairness of the Nuremberg pro-
ceedings despite the decision to admit untested affidavits as "valid evi-
dence"); NANCY A. COMBS, FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS: THE UNCERTAIN
EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 11
(2010) (noting the Nazi's own "meticulous written records" comprised the
critical and most damning written evidence at Nuremberg).
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tional Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE or "Tokyo Tri-
bunal"),23 consistent with the latter institution's fewer guaran-
tees of procedural fairness in comparison to its Nuremberg
counterpart.2 4 The IMTFE Charter specifically sanctioned the
admission of testimony in the form of "affidavit, deposition
and other signed document,"2 5 as well as any "diary, letter or
other document, including sworn or unsworn statements,
which appear to the Tribunal to contain information relating
to the charge."2 6 In other words, unbothered by the fairness
concerns that troubled Jackson, the Tokyo Charter expressly
endorsed admitting directly incriminating written evidence.
On the back of these provisions, the prosecution "decided
at the very outset to rely principally on documentary evidence
and utilize Japanese witnesses only when their testimony was
indispensable."2 7 Echoing Jackson's words, the President of
the Tokyo Tribunal defended this expansive approach to writ-
ten testimony, noting that "affidavits must be used to a large
extent if the trial is not going to be prolonged for many
23. See Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589 [hereinafter Tokyo Charter] (establishing
the Tokyo Tribunal).
24. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Remarks at the 80th Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law, in Forty Years After the Nuremberg and Tokyo
Tribunals: The Impact of the War Crimes Trials on International and National Law,
80 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 56, 62 (1986) (noting that "that the Nuremberg
trial offered more guarantees of procedural fairness to the defendants [than
the IMTFE]"). Minear questions whether better rules of evidence would
have resulted in a fairer trial, however, noting that the prosecution did not
take place in a void. RicHARD H. MINEAR, VicroRS' JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR
CRIMES TRIAL 123 (remarking as well that "[t]he rules of evidence at the
Tokyo trial functioned to facilitate the prosecution and impede the de-
fense"). See also 1 DOCUMENTS ON THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBU-
NAL: CHARTER, INDICTMENT, AND JUDGMENTS lxiii (Neil Boister & Robert
Cryer eds., 2008) (concluding that the "procedure followed at Tokyo has not
commended itself to the judgment of history").
25. Tokyo Charter, supra note 23, art. 13(c) (3).
26. Id. art. 13(c) (4).
27. Gregory Townsend, Structure and Management 171, 216 in INTERNA-
TIONAL PROSECUTORS, 797, 841-42 (Reydams, Wouters & Ryngaert, eds.,
2012) (quoting SOLIS HORWITZ, THE TOKYO TRIALS 539 (1950)). Due to in-
terpretation difficulties, those witnesses called ended up submitting written
statements, so that the only viva voce testimony was that of cross-examination.
Id. at 224.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
82 [Vol. 50:75
PROBLEM OF WITNESS STATEMENTS
years." 28 In the end, the affidavits of prisoners of war com-
prised the preponderance of the prosecution's admitted testi-
mony29 and, unlike at Nuremberg, were routinely admitted
without the opportunity to examine the affiant.30 Judge Pal, a
strident critic of this untested, party-generated evidence,31
noted in his dissent that its admission "increases the range but
decreases the accuracy of the narration."32 Of even greater
concern, a conviction could be secured based on affidavit in-
formation, even if its, contents were uncorroborated and its au-
thor unexamined.33 Accordingly, contemporary academic
commentary decries the decision to restrict the right to ex-
amine witnesses in the name of efficiency, concluding "that
the use of affidavits puts the trial's fairness into question."34
C. Relevant Framework Considerations
This unequivocal condemnation of the Tokyo Tribunal's
reliance on affidavit evidence may seem extreme to those fa-
miliar with the Continental ("inquisitorial") tradition. In Con-
tinental proceedings, recorded witness statements or their
summaries commonly form part of the written case file ("dos-
28. NEIL BOISTER & ROBERT CRYER, THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL: A REAPPRAISAL lxii (2008) (quoting from the Transcript of the
Tokyo Trial at 4453). For the original transcription, see 28 THE TOKYo WAR
CRIMES TRIAL: THE COMPLETE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE IN-
TERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST IN TWENTY-TWO VOLUMES
4453 (R. John Pritchard & Sonia Zaide eds., 1987).
29. TIMOTHY P. MAGA, JUDGMENT AT TOKYO: THE JAPANESE WAR CRIMES
TRIALS 57 (2001). According to Ehrenfreund, 417 witnesses appeared in per-
son, while 719 submitted affidavits or depositions. EHRENFREUND, Supra note
20, at 113.
30. BOISTER & CRYER, supra note 28, at 108-09.
31. MINEAR, supra note 24, at 119.
32. May & Wierda, supra note 13, at 751 (quoting the dissenting opinion
of Judge Pal as reprinted in 2 THE TOKYO JUDGMENT: THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST (I.M.T.F.E.), 29 APRIL 1946-12 NOVEM-
BER 1948 636 (B.V.A. R61ing & C.F. Riter eds., 1977)).
33. Christine Twomey, POWs of the Japanese in Australia, 1945-60: Testi-
mony, Truth and Compensation 282, 284 in THE PACIFIC WAR: AFTERMATHS, RE-
MEMBRANCE & CULTURE (Christina Twomey & Ernest Koh eds., 2015) (ex-
plaining that this practice was defended on the basis that cases would other-
wise be difficult to prove, owing to widespread evidence destruction and the
number of victims killed).
34. BOISTER & CRYER, supra note 28, at 109.
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sier") provided to judges in criminal trials.35 Moreover, Conti-
nental judges normally rely on the contents of these dossiers as
part of their decision-making process.36 This trust placed in
the materials amassed pre-trial, however, is entirely dependent
upon the relevant investigatory process, which includes a mul-
titude of safeguards designed to ensure the integrity of the
dossier's contents.
Perhaps the primary safeguard of dossier material is that,
in Continental systems, the state official tasked with interview-
ing witnesses and collecting documents pre-trial is meant to do
so neutrally,3 7 animated by the system's overarching goal of
discovering the objective truth.38 This means that the state-
ments are accurately recorded by a nonpartisan figure who
questioned the witnesses firsthand and who may have, in the
context of her broader official investigation, deemed the wit-
nesses credible-all factors that warrant giving the statements
"much greater weight than out of court statements related by
parties in the course of a contested trial.""9
35. See, e.g., Megan Fairlie, The Marriage of Common and Continental Law
and Its Progeny, Due Process Deficit, 4 INT'L CIM. L. Rnv. 243, 249 (2004)
(describing the investigation phase of Continental criminal proceedings and
noting that the resulting case file "must contain summaries of all testimony
and records of proof-taking activity"). See also Karel de Meester et al., Investi-
gations, Coercive Measures, Arrest and Surrender, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: RULES AND PRINCIPLES 171, 279 (Goran Sluiter et al. eds., 2013)
(noting that "interrogation transcripts" are included in the dossier).
36. de Meester et al., supra note 35, at 279 ("The out of court statements
included in the case file can normally be considered by the judges during
the trial proceedings."). See also FiRNcis PAKES, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE 91 (2012) (noting that, in inquisitorial criminal justice, "great emphasis
is placed on information in the case file" and that courts "might base much
of their decision-making on its contents").
37. See, e.g., Fausto Pocar & Linda Carter, The Challenge of Shaping Proce-
dures in International Courts, 1, 20-21, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE: THE INTERFACE OF CIL LAW AND COMMON LAw LEGAL SYSTEMS (Linda
Carter & Fausto Pocar, eds., 2013). See also Mirjan DamaSka, Evidentiary Barri-
ers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121
U. PENN. L. REv. 506, 511 (1973) (describing Continental investigations as
"purportedly non-partisan").
38. See, e.g., JACQUELINE HODGSON, FRENCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE 67 (2005);
Fairlie, supra note 35, at 254; William Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian
Code of Criminal Procedure: The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System
on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (1992).
39. Sean Doran et al., Rethinking Adversariness in Nonjury Criminal Trials,
23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 21 (1995).
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In addition, Continental pretrial statements are often
taken in a formal setting, sometimes under oath. 40 Even in ju-
risdictions where oath-taking is not the norm, this safeguard
may nevertheless be a prerequisite to the statement being read
at trial if the witness is unavailable for examination.4 Moreo-
ver, witnesses who provide false information to investigating
officials may be subject to prosecution,4 2 irrespective of
whether their pretrial statements are unsworn.43 Furthermore,
depending upon the jurisdiction, other supplementary mea-
sures may be available to ensure the integrity of this aspect of
the investigatory process. For example, witnesses may be inter-
viewed in the presence of defense counsel who can also ex-
amine the witness, an approach that enables the court to later
"rely on the accuracy of the record of such interviews."4 4 Fi-
40. In France, the formality of the process can begin even before a state-
ment is taken, as the investigating judge may summon the witness by bailiff
or police officer. CODE DE PROCtDURE PtNALE [C. PR. PtN.) [CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE CODE] art. 101 (Fr.) (providing that the witness may also be sum-
moned by letter). However beckoned, the witness is put on notice that,
should she refuse to appear for questioning, she may be compelled to do so.
Id. Once before the investigating judge, the witness is required to swear to
tell the truth before her statement is taken in the presence of a clerk, and an
official record is made of the questions and her answers. Id. arts. 102-03.
41. In Germany, for example, witnesses who are interviewed pretrial are
generally not expected to take an oath unless the court deems it necessary
because of the decisive importance of the statement. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG
[StPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], § 59(1) (Ger.). However, an oath
may be administered in preparatory proceedings if the witness will likely not
be available for the main hearing. Id. § 62(2). This is so that the statement
can be read at trial. Id. at § 254.
42. Under the French code, if a pretrial witness statement later appears
to be false, the presiding judge may order that the witness be brought before
law enforcement for the opening of a judicial investigation. CODE DE PROCt-
DURE PtNALE [C. PR. PEN.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 342 (Fr.). Alter-
natively, the judge may order that the witness be brought before the district
prosecutor for a judicial investigation into the perjury. Id. art. 457. In Ger-
many, a witness who provides a false, sworn statement pretrial may be prose-
cuted for perjury. STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE], §154 (Ger.).
43. False, unsworn testimony is punishable in Germany as a lesser offense
than perjury. STRAFGESET-ZBUCH [StGB) [PENAL CODE],§153 (Ger.) (providing
that "whosoever as a witness or expert gives false unsworn testimony before a
court or other authority competent to examine witnesses and experts under
oath shall be liable to imprisonment from three months to five years")
(translated by Prof. Dr. Michael Bohlander).
44. PAKEs, supra note 36, at 124 (describing the investigatory process in
the Netherlands).
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nally, the trial that follows this neutral investigatory period is
not one in which the parties bear responsibility for evidence
production; instead, the trial is led by ajudicial fact-finder who
relies on the dossier in her development of the evidence. 4 5
The Continental structure, however, contrasts sharply
with the institutional frameworks of the seminal post-WWII
proceedings, as well as that of most contemporary interna-
tional criminal justice institutions that have followed them.46
Indeed, both the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals employed
an adversarial model for their pretrial and trial proceedings.4 7
As in common law systems, 48 evidence-gathering at the IMT
and the IMTFE was a partisan process,49 and the parties intro-
45. Fairlie, supra note 35, at 254 (describing the process and noting that
the parties may be permitted to question witnesses, but only after judicial
interrogation); see also Michele Caianiello, First Decisions on the Admission of
Evidence at ICC Trials: A Blending of Accusatorial and Inquisitorial Models? 9 J.
INT'L CIM. JUST. 385, 393 (2011) (noting that the trial is "strongly condi-
tioned on by the previous phases" and that witnesses called ordinarily con-
firm their prior statements, especially in jurisdiction where they face crimi-
nal sanctions for having given a false statement during the investigation).
46. Colleen M. Rohan, Rules Governing the Presentation of Testimonial Evi-
dence, in PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 499,
524 (Karim A. A. Khan et al. eds., 2010) ("An important difference between
procedures utilized in traditional civil law jurisdictions and the pre-trial in-
vestigation which results in the production of written statements in the inter-
national courts, is that in the international courts pre-trial investigation is
party-driven.") See also Goran Sluiter, Adversarial v. Inquisitorial Model, in TRE
OxFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALJUSTICE 230, 231 (Antonio
Cassese ed., 2009) (discussing the dominance of the adversarial system in
international criminal justice).
47. See, e.g., Sluiter, supra note 46, at 231 (noting that both Nuremberg
and Tokyo adhered to the adversarial model, and attributing this primarily
to the influential role played by common law countries in the development
of the institutions); see also CASSESE'S INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 341-42
(Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2013) (explaining why an adversarial model was
adopted at Nuremberg).
48. See, e.g., Fairlie, supra note 35, at 250-51.
49. Pursuant to each Charter, the chief prosecutors were responsible for
the collection of evidence. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 9, art. 15(a); To-
kyo Charter, supra note 23, art. 8(a). In reality, the Allied Powers conducted
most of the investigation and evidence-gathering and provided the results to
the prosecution for trial. See, e.g., Salvatore ZappalA, Comparative Models and
the Enduring Relevance of the Accusatorial-Inquisitorial Dichotomy, in INrERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: RULES AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 35, at 44,
46-47 (discussing Nuremberg); SKIPPER STEELY, PEARL HARBOR COUNTDOWN
366 (2008) (discussing Tokyo). As for the defense, see Nuremberg Charter,
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duced their respective evidence (or their "version of the
facts") at trial.5 0 This suggests a need for evidentiary gatekeep-
ing that simply does not exist in judge-led Continental trials.5 1
Similarly, unlike in Continental systems, the relevant witnesses
at Nuremberg and Tokyo were not independent, but tied to a
particular party, so that it is fair to expect that "the partisan
nature of [the] trial[ ] tend[ed] to make partisans of the wit-
nesses."5 2 This, in turn, demonstrates why the use of untested
affidavit evidence stains the memory of Nuremberg and calls
into question the fairness of the proceedings at Tokyo. Simply
put, party-driven evidence production creates "anxiety about
potentially misleading information." 53 Accordingly, fairness re-
quires "that each party have an immediate opportunity to chal-
lenge sources of information presented by the opponent."5 4
III. PRIOR RECORDED STATEMENTS AT THE ICTY
A. The Initial Approach
Part II's brief overview of the post-WWII proceedings and
their critical reception helps to explain "the clouded legacy"
created by the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals regarding
"whether, and how much, live witness testimony can be legiti-
mately dispensed with in a criminal trial."55 The associated cri-
tique also provides insight into why the next phase of interna-
tional criminal justice charted a different course and initially
excluded unexamined written testimony from trials conducted
supra note 9, art. 16(e) and Tokyo Charter, supra note 23, art. 9(e) (ex-
pressly addressing evidence-gathering by the defense and providing for the
prospect of institutional support for obtaining it).
50. Zappal;, supra note 49, at 46 (describing the Nuremberg process as
one in which the prosecution presented "its version of facts" and the defense
was "allowed to rebut by pointing out any contradictions or inaccuracies");
see also Nuremberg Charter, supra note 9, art. 15(a), 16(e); Tokyo Charter,
supra note 23, art. 8(a), 9(d).
51. Doran et al., supra note 39, at 20-21.
52. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUS-
TICE 86 (1949).
53. MiRjAN R. DAMA.ICA, EVIDENCE LAw ADIuvr 79 (1997).
54. Id. (maintaining that it is not surprising that "anxiety about poten-
tially misleading information reaches its highest point in Anglo-American
justice"); see also Doran et al., supra note 39, at 20 (noting that evidentiary
rules are necessary in the contest model in part because "they prevent par-
ties from basing their cases on evidence that cannot be properly tested").
55. Wald, supra note 12, at 552.
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at the first of the modern day courts. In fact, when the ICTY
judges adopted the Tribunal's original Rules of Procedure and
Evidence (RPE),56 then-President Antonio Cassese expressly
acknowledged the judges' intent to circumvent the blemishes
that tarnished recollections of Nuremberg and Tokyo.57 Ac-
cordingly, at the ICTY, where "the collection and presentation
of evidence [likewise] follows the common law adversarial sys-
tem, "58 the earliest version of the judge-drafted rules estab-
lished an express preference for in-person testimony,59 despite
an otherwise flexible approach of generally admitting relevant,
probative evidence.60 Under these initial rules, the one excep-
tion to the principle of orality was that depositions could be
introduced, but only in "exceptional circumstances"61 and
only when the opposing party could cross-examine the depo-
56. The Tribunal's statute delegated the tasks of drafting, adopting and
amending the RPE to its judges. ICTY Statute, supra note 7, art. 15.
57. According to Cassese, the judges' rulemaking process included "a
conscious effort to make good the flaws of Nuremberg and Tokyo." State-
ment by the President Made at a Briefing to Members of Diplomatic Mis-
sions, Summary of the Rules of Procedure at the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
[ICTY], U.N. Doc. IT/29 (1994), reprinted in VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P.
SCHARF, 2 AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 650 (1995) [hereinafter Statement by the ICTY
President].
58. Patrick L. Robinson, Rough Edges in the Alignment of Legal Systems in the
Proceedings at the ICTY 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1037, 1039 (2005) (noting that
the ICTY employs "a party-driven system" as opposed to the "judge-driven"
fact-finding and evidence presentation found in Continental systems); see
also John Jackson, Faces of Transitional justice: Two Attempts to Build Common
Standards Between National Boundaries, in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN
A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 221, 240 (John Jackson et al.
eds., 2008) (describing the ICTY as "fundamentally adversarial" because its
"evidence is collected and presented by a prosecutor who has to prove guilt
rather than an independent magistrate").
59. The Sub-rule provided: "Witnesses shall, in principle, be heard di-
rectly by the Chambers unless a Chamber has ordered that witness be heard
by means of a deposition as provided for in Rule 71." Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia [ICTY], RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, at Rule
90(A), U.N. Doc. IT/32 (Mar. 14, 1994). For the reader's convenience,
"ICTY RPE" will be used to refer to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of
the ICTY, with specific versions of the rules noted accordingly.
60. Id. Rule 89(C) ("A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence that it
deems to have probative value.").
61. Id. Rule 71(A).
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nent,62 thereby maintaining "the essence of [the ICTY's] party-
driven process."6 3
Critically, this preference for in-person testimony essen-
tially ensured that judges would be able to directly vet the
credibility of party-affiliated witnesses. This assured an inde-
pendent judicial assessment of witness trustworthiness, in par-
ticular through the observation of the witnesses' unled testi-
mony.64 Combined with cross-examination, famously dubbed
by Wigmore as "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth," 65 this early preference for live testimony
contributed to the accuracy of judicial fact-finding. It follows
that the ICTY's original assurance of witness presence and
cross-examination helped contribute to the perceived fairness
of the institution. In fact, then-contemporary assessments of
the newly formed Tribunal lauded the approach as one that
would not endanger the right of confrontation, as did the par-
tisan presentation of untested written testimony at the IMT
and IMTFE.66 Instead, in a manner consistent with the devel-
opment of the right to a fair trial as a human right in the post-
WWII years,6 7 the Tribunal appeared committed to safeguard-
ing the statutory right of the accused to examine the witnesses
62. Id. Rule 71(C).
63. Robinson, supra note 58, at 1043 ("[T]he Tribunal system for the
presentation of evidence is basically adversarial, and the essence of that
party-driven process is cross-examination.").
64. See, e.g., John Jackson, The Best Epistemic Fit for International Criminal
Trials: Beyond the Adversarial-Inquisitorial Dichotomy, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 17,
32 (2009) (observing that focus on cross-examination usually overshadows
the importance of the fact-finder's ability to make a full evaluation, of the
witness's testimony).
65. JoHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 29, § 1367 (3rd ed. 1940).
66. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 22, at 866 (citing IMT precedent as
demonstrating the importance of adhering to the dictates of the adversarial
model adopted).
67. Shortly after the creation of the IMTFE, the right to a fair trial was
affirmatively recognized, both regionally and internationally, as a human
right. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts.
9-12 (Dec. 10, 1948); Org. of Am. States [OAS], American Declaration on
the Rights and Duties of Man, art. XVIII, May 2, 1948, O.A.S.T.S. No. 30. See
also David Harris, The Right to a Fair Trial as a Human Right, 16 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 352, 378 (1967). These post-WWII developments are considered in
greater detail in Fairlie, supra note 35, at 266-67, describing the develop-
ment of fair trial rights in the United States and abroad.
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against him.6 8 In fact, the approach provided even greater pro-
tection to the accused than was dictated by international
human rights law at the time.69
B. Early Experimentation with Written Witness Statements
Before long, however, Tribunal judges became concerned
about the length of ICTY trials, specifically citing the "great
deal of reliance placed on the testimony of witnesses rather
than on affidavits" as contributing to its overly long proceed-
ings.70 Under pressure from their United Nations funders,71
the judges responded by implementing "a number of steps to
reduce the length of trials"72 that resulted in a shift away from
68. ICTY Statute, supra note 7, art. 21(4) (e) ("In the determination of
any charge against the accused pursuant to the present Statute, the accused
shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: ...
(e) to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him. . . ."). Zappald
credits the decision to impose international human rights standards on the
ICTY as "a move towards abandoning the victor's justice paradigm." SALVA-
TORE ZAPPALA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 80
(2003). Notably, however, this robust right to cross-examination did not ex-
tend so far as to exclude hearsay evidence. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Aleksovski,
Case No. IT-95-1/1-AR73, Decision on Prosecutor's Appeal on Admissibility
of Evidence (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 16, 1999) (ex-
pressly acknowledging that hearsay evidence may be admitted without the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant).
69. For example, the European Convention on Human Rights parallels
ICTY Statute art. 21(4)(e), providing the accused the right "to examine or
have examined witnesses against him." European Convention on Human
Rights art. 6(3)(d), Nov. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. However, the case law
of the European Court makes clear that this is not an unqualified right. For
a then-contemporary application of this principle, see, for example, Artner
v. Austria, 203 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 10, 11 22-24 (1992).
70. Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTYI, Sixth Ann. Rep. of
the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Vio-
lations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
Since 1991, 1 13, U.N. Doc A/54/187-S/1999/846 (Aug. 25, 1999) [hereinaf-
ter Sixth Ann. ICTY Rep.]. See also ANTONIo CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL LAw 42 (2003) (identifying the time-consuming process of putting on
live evidence as the primary culprit for the length of ICTY trials).
71. See ICIY Statute, supra note 7, art. 32 (providing that the Tribunal's
expenses derive from the UN budget); see also G.A. Res 53/212, It 5, 18
(Feb. 10, 1999) (calling on the Secretary-General to evaluate "the effective
operation and functioning" of the ICTY and "take all necessary actions to
ensure that the [ICTY] is administered with maximum efficiency and econ-
omy").
72. Sixth Ann. ICTY Rep., supra note 70, 1 14.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
90 [Vol. 50:75
PROBLEM OF WITNESS STATEMENTS
the Tribunal's heavy reliance on live witness testimony. These
steps included lightening the restrictions on deposition evi-
dence7 3 and introducing a new rule (94 ter) to facilitate the
use of written evidence, 74 albeit with "strict procedural protec-
tions."7 5 All the while, the Tribunal continued to distinguish
itself from its Nuremberg and Tokyo predecessors, emphasiz-
ing that "a great deal of reliance is placed upon the testimony
of witnesses rather than on affidavits," and that the ICTY re-
mained "committed to ensuring that the rights of the accused
are fully respected in accordance with contemporary human
rights norms."7 6
Even with these amendments in place, the ICTY Prosecu-
tor continued to look for ways to increase the range of admissi-
ble written testimony. Part of this strategy included using Rule
89(C), a general evidentiary provision that authorizes Trial
Chambers to admit relevant, probative evidence,77 as a way
around the "strict procedural protections" embodied in Rule
94 ter.7 8 Like its ICC counterpart,79 Rule 89(C) enables the
73. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 12, at 545-56 (discussing the amended rule
governing deposition testimony).
74. ICTY RPE, Rule 92 ter, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 14 (Dec. 7, 1998) (ena-
bling the parties to introduce untested affidavits for the purpose of cor-
roborating live witness testimony). This provision was later removed during
the Twenty-third Extraordinary Session held in December 2000 to revise the
tribunal rules. ICTY RPE, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 19 (Jan. 19, 2001).
75. Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-AR73.5, Decision on Ap-
peal Regarding Statement of a Deceased Witness, 1 21 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000). See also Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No.
IT-95-14/2-AR73.6, Decision on Appeal Regarding the Admission into Evi-
dence of Seven Affidavits and One Formal Statement, 1 30 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 18, 2000) (explaining that 94 ter "prescribes
a precise and specific sequence of events" such that written evidence must be
received before the live witness whose testimony it was meant to corroborate,
so that the non-offering party is able to cross-examine the live witness on
topics of dispute).
76. 6th Ann. ICTY Rep., supra note 70, 1 13.
77. ICTY RPE, R.89(C), UN Doc. IT/32 (1994).
78. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-AR73.5, Decision
on Appeal Regarding Statement of a Deceased Witness, 1 5 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000); see also Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case
No. IT-95-14/2-AR73.6, Decision on Appeal Regarding the Admission into
Evidence of Seven Affidavits and One Formal Statement, ¶¶ 2, 43 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 18, 2000) (noting that the prose-
cution used Rule 89(C) as a fallback provision before the Trial Chamber).
For an in-depth discussion of these decisions, see Megan A. Fairlie, Due Pro-
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parties to introduce, and Trial Chambers to consider, out-of-
court statements for their truth.so As the Kordic Appeals
Chamber made clear, however, this general principle that
hearsay is admissible has its limits. Most commonly, the princi-
ple had been applied when a live witness repeated an out-of-
court statement, something the Appeals Chamber described as
"a very different matter, in terms of the preference for live tes-
timony and the accused's right to examine the witnesses
against him, from admitting complete statements of primary
witnesses in lieu of calling them to court."81
Ironically, this rights-protective finding rendered the Tri-
bunal's approach to written evidence unstable. In light of the
continuing pressure to expedite ICTY proceedings, there re-
mained a need for a more efficient way to consider time-con-
suming "crime-base" evidence.82 Consequently, the aforemen-
tioned Kordic decision led to the replacement of Rule 94 ter
with a new provision: Rule 92 bis.83 Simultaneously, the Tribu-
cess Erosion: The Diminution of Live Testimony at the ICTY, 34 CAL. WEST. INT'L
L.J. 47, 65-70 (2003).
79. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 69(4) (authorizing the Court to
admit "any evidence" after considering it probative value and potential
prejudice).
80. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-AR73, Decision on
Prosecutor's Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence, 1 15 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 16, 1999).
81. Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-AR73.5, Decision on Ap-
peal Regarding Statement of a Deceased Witness, n.21 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000).
82. See, e.g., Steven Kay, The Move from Oral Evidence to Written Evidence, 2 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 495, 497-98 (2004); see also GIDEON BOAS, THE MILOSEVIC
TRIAL: LESSONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS 135 (2007) (describing crime base evidence as involving
"crimes committed, as opposed to any responsibility of the accused for
them"). Such evidence could, for example, assist the prosecution in estab-
lishing the widespread or systematic contextual requirements for crimes
against humanity. Because there was a great deal of overlap amongst ICTY
cases, discerning a means by which to introduce crime base evidence in pa-
per form was also an attractive option because it could "alleviate the need for
witnesses to reappear multiple times to present essentially the same testi-
mony before different panels of judges." Fergal Gaynor et. al., Law of Evi-
dence, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: RULES AND PRINCIPLES, supra
note 35, at 1044, 1049.
83. Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocu-
tory Appeal Concerning Rule 92 bis (C), 1 28 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the For-
mer Yugoslavia June 7, 2002) (noting that "92 bis was introduced as a result
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nal eliminated its preference for live testimony through its
adoption of sub-rule 89(F) ,84 Which established a "no prefer-
ence alternative."85 These amendments marked a critical turn-
ing point for the ICTY. First, sub-rule 89(F) created a "dra-
matic change in the way evidence [was] to be received by the
International Tribunal." 86 This change was "a 180 degree turn
from the earlier emphasis on the 'principle' of live testi-
mony,"87 although this was scarcely acknowledged in the Tri-
bunal's accompanying report, which no longer emphasized
the distinction between the ICTY approach and that of the
post-WWII tribunals.88 For its part, Rule 92 bis would go on to
become "the single most successful rule amendment of the
[ICTY] if measured by durability, broad acceptance and fre-
quency of use."89 It would also later serve as the model for ICC
revised Rule 68(2) (b).9o
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CONTEMPORARY TEMPLATE
A. Reliability Issues
As introduced, Rule 92 bis permitted the admission of
written statements (declared and verified in a form prescribed
by the rule), as well as written statements by unavailable de-
of the Kordic and Cerkez Decision"). See also Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia [ICTY], Eighth Ann. Rep. of the International Tribunal for the Prosecu-
tion of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 1 51, U.N. Doc. A/56/352-
S/2001/865 (Sept. 17, 2001) [hereinafter Eighth Ann. ICTY Rep.] (noting
that, of the new rules then-created, the most significant was Rule 92 bis and
that the rule "provides a framework for the admission of formal written state-
ments and transcripts . .. at the discretion of the Trial Chamber").
84. ICTY RPE, R.89 (F), UN Doc. IT/32/Rev.19 (2000) ("A Chamber
may receive the evidence of a witness orally or, where the interests ofjustice
allow, in written form.").
85. Wald, supra note 12, at 548.
86. Gideon Boas, Creating Laws of Evidence for International Criminal Law:
The ICTY and the Principle of Flexibility, 12 CRm. L.F. 41, 48 (2001).
87. Wald, supra note 12, at 548 (noting that Rule 89(F) states a "counter-
principle" to the Tribunal's "distinct preference for live witness testimony").
88. Fairlie, supra note 78, at 71 (noting that the Tribunal emphasized this
distinction just two years earlier).
89. Christopher Gosnell, Admissibility of Evidence, in PRINCIPLES OF Evi-
DENCE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 375, 396.
90. ICC RPE, Rule 68(2) (b), ICC-PIDS-LT-02-002/13_Eng (2013). Rules
amended by ICC 2013 Amendments, supra note 4.
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clarants (unsworn and in no specified form),91 and transcripts
from prior ICTY proceedings. 9 2 Notably, the rule required
neither that the statements corroborate live testimony nor that
they be accompanied by the right of cross-examination, tech-
niques the Tribunal previously employed to provide a "guaran-
tee of reliability."9 3 Instead, the "cumulative nature" of a state-
ment was a factor in favor of its admission, and cross-examina-
tion of its author a matter of judicial discretion.9 4 Accordingly,
the new rule further emphasized that the statutory right of an
ICTY accused "to examine, or have examined, witnesses
against him, is not an absolute one,"9 5 while simultaneously
remaining "silent as to the factors that should influence the
exercise of the Chamber's discretion" regarding cross-exami-
nation.96 At the same time, however, these reliability short-
comings were ostensibly tempered by the fact that the rule was
limited to statements that go "to [the] proof of a matter other
91. For an unavailable witness, the rule provided that a Trial Chamber
may "find[ ] from the circumstances in which the statement was made and
recorded that there are satisfactory indicia of its reliability." ICTY RPE, Rule
92 bis (C) (ii), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 19 (Jan. 19, 2001). After a series of
subsequent amendments, the provision on written statements of unavailable
declarants was ultimately relocated to Rule 92 quater. ICTY RPE, Rule 92
quarter,U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 49 (May 22, 2013). See also infra Part VII.
92. ICTY RPE, Rule 92 bis (D), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 19 (Jan. 19, 2001).
93. Wald, supra note 12, at 542 (applying this description to the require-
ments of corroboration and cross-examination).
94. ICTY RPE, Rule 92 bis (A) (i), (E), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 19 (Jan. 19,
2001). A later version of the rule moves the cross-examination language to
92 bis (C). ICTY RPE, Rule 92 bis (C), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 39 (Sept. 26,
2006) (adding that "if it does so decide, the provisions of Rule 92 ter shall
apply"). For a discussion of the subsequently adopted 92 ter, see infra Part VI.
95. Prosecutor v. Milogevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Prosecution
Motion for the Admission of Transcripts in Lieu of Viva Voce Testimony
Pursuant to Rule 92 bis (D)-Foca Transcripts, 1 24, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia June 30, 2003) (citing to Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No.
IT-98-29-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Rule 92 bis
(C) (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June. 7, 2002)). Notably,
this right was never absolute, in light of the Tribunal's decision to admit
hearsay. See supra note 68; see also Peter Murphy, No Free Lunch, No Free Proof
The Indiscriminate Admission of Evidence is a Serious Flaw in International Crimi-
nal Trials, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 539, 560 (2010) (describing the decision to
admit hearsay in international criminal proceedings as something that re-
sults in "[t]he inevitable derogation from the accused's fundamental right to
cross-examine [that] has inescapable implications for the fairness of the
trial").
96. Robinson, supra note 58, at 1042.
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than the acts and conduct of the accused" as charged in the
indictment.97 Along these lines, when Rule 92 bis was first
adopted, the Tribunal emphasized that the rule was designed
to "facilitate the admission by way of written statement of pe-
ripheral or background evidence in order to expedite proceed-
ings while protecting the rights of the accused."98
B. Framework Considerations at the ICTY
ICTY appellate jurisprudence explains that the decision
to limit Rule 92 bis evidence to material unrelated to the acts
of the accused "reflects a concern for the reliability of the ma-
terial prepared by a party for the purposes of trial proceed-
ings."99 Specifically, the Appeals Chamber announced that the
rule applies solely to documents created by the parties for the
purpose of litigation,100 material the common law recognizes
as vulnerable to fabrication and liable to "contain [ ] only the
most favourable version of the facts." 01 Thus, consistent with
the ICTYs use of the contest model and associated concerns
regarding party-generated evidence, the rule was designed "to
ensure that the parties contest against each other fairly."102
This aspect of Rule 92 bis serves as a critical reminder that the
Tribunal's adversarial framework necessitates the protection it
provides, even under a rule specifically devised for the prose-
cution. 0 3
97. Id. at 1043.
98. Eighth Ann. ICTY Rep., supra note 83, 1 51.
99. Eugene O'Sullivan & Deirdre Montgomery, The Erosion of the Right to
Confontation Under the Cloak ofFairness at the ICTY 8J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 511,
517 (2010). See alsoJackson, supra note 64, at 31 ("One of the reasons why
common law adversarial systems have been traditionally suspicious of written
statements is because there are well-founded doubts about the reliability of
statements taken by parties for the purpose of litigation.").
100. Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocu-
tory Appeal Concerning Rule 92 bis (C), 1 31 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the For-
mer Yugoslavia June 7, 2002) ("[R]ule 92 bis has no effect upon hearsay
material which was not prepared for the purposes of legal proceedings.").
101. Id. 1 29.
102. Doran et al., supra note 39, at 20.
103. Indeed, even though Rule 92 bis and later provisions governing the
admission of written statements may be used by the defense, these rules "are
primarily designed to be employed by the Prosecution." Kay, supra note 82,
at 496. This fact is reflected in practice, wherein the rules have been used
more frequently by the prosecution than the defense. See Yvonne McDer-
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This is particularly significant because Tribunal jurispru-
dence sometimes appears to redefine the role of the ICTY
Prosecutor from that of an adversary to a more Continental-
like figure who "represents the public interest of the interna-
tional community and has to act with objectivity and fairness
appropriate to that circumstance."1 o 4 In fact, dicta from one
decision goes so far as to claim that the ICTY prosecutor "is an
organ of international criminal justice whose object is not sim-
ply to secure a conviction but to present the case for the Prose-
cution, which includes not only inculpatory, but also exculpa-
tory evidence, in order to assist the Chamber to discover truth
in a judicial setting."1 0 5 As 92 bis implicitly (and properly) rec-
ognizes, however, this sweeping language finds no support in
the Tribunal's Statute or Rules, 106 nor, indeed, in the ICTY
Prosecution's actual investigatory and trial practices.107
mott, The Admissibility and Weight of Written Testimony, 26 LEIDEN J. INT'L L.
971, 976 (2013).
104. Prosecutor v. Milogevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR.73.2, Decision on Ad-
missibility of Prosecution Investigator's Evidence, Partial Dissenting Opinion
of Judge Shahabuddeen, ¶ 18 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Sept. 30, 2002) (citing, as the basis for this assertion, representations made
by representatives of the Office of the Prosecutor throughout the course of
trial proceedings, along with a regulation issued by the Chief Prosecutor in
1999). For a discussion of the Continental prosecutor's (purportedly) impar-
tial role, see, for example, Thomas Weigend, A judge by Another Name? Com-
parative Perspectives on the Role of the Public Prosecutor, in THE PROSECUTOR IN
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 377, 381 (Luna & Wade eds., 2012).
105. Prosecutor v. Kupre~kic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Decision on Communi-
cations Between the Parties and Their Witnesses, I ii (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 21, 1998).
106. For example, Tribunal Rules only provide for prosecutorial disclo-
sure of exculpatory materials known to the prosecution. ICTY RPE, Rule
68(A), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 19 (Jan. 19, 2001). Consequently, "no appro-
priate legal framework supported th[e aforementioned] aspiration." ZAP-
PALA, supra note 68, at 41 (remarking that the Tribunal might consider
amending its Rules to provide that the Prosecutor search for exculpatory
evidence).
107. As a then-legal officer with the ICTY OTP explained, "[T]he prosecu-
tion does not endeavour to provide the Trial Chamber with all the informa-
tion relevant to the crime and the accused, but rather only that evidence
which supports the prosecution's theory of the case. Thus, it remains for the
defense to submit exculpatory evidence and to call witnesses for the ac-
cused." Daryl A. Mundis, From 'Common Law' Towards 'Civil Law': The Evolu-
tion of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 367, 381
n.75 (2001).
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In fact, the concerns animating the limitations on the
scope and nature of 92 bis evidence were not simply theoreti-
cal ones associated with the ICTY's adversarial framework.
Rather, they had a basis in Tribunal experience. For instance,
one Appeals Chamber decision expressly acknowledges that-
pre-92 bis-questions concerning the reliability of "written
statements given by prospective witnesses to OTP [Office of
the Prosecution] investigators . . . ha[d] unfortunately
arisen."108 As the judge who authored that opinion later ex-
plained, the acts and conduct limitation was therefore de-
signed both to "ensure the reliability of the evidence in rela-
tion to it, and to prevent the possibility of the statement plac-
ing the best gloss on the evidence which suits th [e offering]
party." 109
Because this provides just one example of the ways in
which the combination of the prosecutor's adversarial role
and the use of written evidence has the potential to affect the
fairness of proceedings, 110 the ensuing analysis examines the
rules governing written evidence and associated case law
through the lens of the Tribunal's party-driven construct. In so
doing, it identifies the fairness problems created by a
prosecutorial pattern of introducing more (and more damn-
ing) written evidence against the accused, while simultane-
ously limiting the test of cross-examination as well as the
judges' ability to assess witness demeanor. Before engaging
fully in this discussion, however, it makes sense to first explain
why the lessons drawn from the ICTY experience bear direct
relevance for the ICC.
108. Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocu-
tory Appeal Concerning Rule 92 bis (C), 1 30 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the For-
mer Yugoslavia June 7, 2002). The Court later notes that the rule's purpose
is to "restrict the admissibility of this very special type of hearsay to that
which falls within its terms." Id. at 1 31.
109. Prosecutor v. Milogevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.4, Decisions on In-
terlocutory Appeal on the Admissibility of Evidence in Chief in the Form of
Written Statements, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hunt, 1 19 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 30, 2003).
110. For example, the prosecutor could alternatively place "the best gloss"
on the evidence by calling only the strongest witnesses while using the unt-
ested, written statements of weaker witnesses "to pile up the evidence . . . to
reinforce its persuasive power." FRED GALVEs, EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID &
THOMAS LEACH, EVIDENCE SIMULATIONS 14-15 (2013) (explaining the bene-
fits of cumulative evidence in an adversarial system).
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C. Framework Relevance at the ICC
At first glance, one might assume that any fairness assess-
ments regarding ICTY practice would have, at best, a more
limited application at the ICC-at least insofar as they relate to
the party-driven aspect of ICTY proceedings. This is because of
the "principle of objectivity" that flows from the statutory man-
date that the ICC Prosecutor "investigate incriminating and
exonerating circumstances equally," a requirement designed
"to establish the truth.""' This Continental addition to the
ICC statute has been lauded by scholars trained in that tradi-
tion, who have described it as "the most spectacular and inno-
vative affirmation of prosecutorial impartiality"'1 2 and as some-
thing that constitutes a "major difference" to ICTY practice.1 13
If so, this suggests that the aforementioned unease regarding
untested, party-driven evidence (and related concerns) does
not apply with the same force at the ICC, at least not with re-
spect to prosecution-generated evidence. To this end, it has
even been argued that the information collected by the ICC
Prosecutor "can be seen as relatively reliable, as the prosecutor
must be objective and investigate in favour too of the ac-
cused." 14 Thus far, however, the ICC experience belies these
111. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 54(1) (a). See Stefan Kirsch, The Trial
Proceedings Before the ICC, 6 Ir'L CRiM. L. REv. 275, 286 (2006) (interpreting
the provision to create an affirmative obligation on the part of the judges "to
intervene whenever [they] become aware that the Prosecution might not
fulfil its obligation to investigate and to present all aspects of the case during
the trial").
112. Luc C6te, Independence and Impartiality, in INTERNATIONAL PROSECU-
TORS 319, 359 (Luc Reydams et al. eds., 2012) (describing the provision as
"unprecedented"). However, C6t6 later acknowledges that this "significant
improvement in the law has been tempered in practice." Id. at 360.
113. Kirsch, supra note 111, at 286. See also Pocar & Carter, supra note 37,
at 23 (describing the ICC Prosecutor as "more neutral" in comparison to the
statutorily created "non-neutral prosecutor" at the ICTY); Jessica Peake, A
Spectrum of International Criminal Procedure: Shifting Patterns of Power Distribution
in International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, 26 PACE INT'L L. REv. 182, 215
(2014) (concluding that the role of the ICC prosecutor marks "a stark depar-
ture from a prosecutor in a pure adversarial system" and creates a figure
more akin to an official investigator in the inquisitorial system").
114. CHRISTOPH SAFFERLING, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDuRE 79
(2012).
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views and raises real questions about the existence of the so-
called "principle of objectivity."115
Consider, for example, Judge May's assessment of the
principle, penned before the Court became operational, and
defined in contrast to the practice at the ICTY: "the prosecutor
of the ICC will have duties of 'truth-seeking' beyond the adver-
sarial framework, and must conduct investigations to find both
incriminating and exonerating evidence. (Whereas the prose-
cutor of the ad hoc tribunals has been under a duty to dis-
close, rather than seek such evidence)."116 This is the distinc-
tion routinely maintained, as demonstrated in C6t6's more re-
cent assessment: "Beyond the usual disclosure obligations
introduced originally [at the ICTY], the ICC Statute demands
that the prosecutor actively and equally investigate exonerat-
ing circumstances turning him into 'an objective and impartial
body of justice.""'7 However, a member of the ICC OTP re-
cently expressed a very different view, maintaining that the
prosecution fulfills its ostensible objectivity requirement not by
"check[ing] every single thing that could exonerate the ac-
cused," nor by affirmatively seeking out exonerating evidence,
but merely by investigating such evidence as it comes across
and disclosing it to the defense.l"8 Under this view, the ICC
Prosecutor indiscernibly resembles her adversarial counterpart
115. See generally Caroline Buisman, The Prosecutor's Obligation to Investigate
Incriminating and Exonerating Circumstances Equally: Illusion or Reality?, 27 LEI-
DENJ. INT'L L. 205 (2014) (providing a litany of examples and concluding, at
page 226, that in every matter analyzed "the prosecution failed to investigate
any of its cases with the thoroughness expected from a diligent prosecutor").
116. RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
330 (2002) (citation omitted).
117. C66, supra note 112, at 359-60 (citations omitted). See also Hans-J6rg
Behrens, Investigation, Trial and Appeal in the International Criminal Court Stat-
ute, 6 EUR. J. CRIME CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 429, 438 (1998) (discussing, inter
alia, the prosecutor's investigative role in appeal proceedings).
118. John D. Jackson & Yassin M. Brunger, Fragmentation and Harmoniza-
tion in the Development ofEvidentiary Practices in International Criminal Tribunals,
in Pluralism in International Criminal Law 159, 181 (Elies van Sliedregt &
Sergey Vasiliev eds., 2014) (quoting Respondent 10).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
2017] 99
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
at the ICTY,1 19 a conclusion reinforced by academic observa-
tion1 2 0 and numerous examples in ICC practice to date.
For instance, in the Court's first prosecution, the OTP in-
famously employed a "secretive evidentiary regime,"12 1
whereby it promised to keep the information it gathered from
certain third parties confidential.12 2 These agreements pre-
cluded the prosecution from fulfilling its disclosure obliga-
tions to the accused under the Statute.1 23 Moreover, because
the agreements were used extensively, the Trial Chamber
found that the OTP's investigatory conduct involved the
"wholesale and serious abuse" of a designedly exceptional pro-
vision in the Rome Statute. 124 This (mis)conduct even proved
the temporary undoing of the trial because "a significant body
of exculpatory evidence" was withheld from the accused, 125 a
119. See id. (describing OTP Respondent 10's interpretation of Article
54(1) as one that "does not vary considerably from what one would expect a
common law prosecutor to do"); see also Robert Heinsch, How to Achieve Fair
and Expeditious Proceedings Before the ICC: Is It Time for a More judge-Dominated
Approach?, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 479, 485 (Carsten Stahn & G6ran Sluiter eds., 2009) (noting that
"one can get the feeling that ICC OTP is still behaving much more like an
actor in a typical adversarial proceeding").
120. HANNA KuCzNsKA, THE ACCUSATION MODEL BEFORE THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 52 (2015) ("[T]he prosecution has so far largely
ignored its obligation under Article 54(1) (a) to investigate incriminating
and exonerating circumstances equally.").
121. Sabine Swoboda, The ICC Disclosure Regime-A Defense Perspective, 19
CRIM. L.F. 449, 472 (2008) (deploring a scheme "to drape vital exculpatory
evidence into [sic] a cloak of confidentiality").
122. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 54(3) (e) ("The Prosecutor may ...
agree not to disclose, at any stage of the proceedings, documents or infor-
mation that the Prosecutor obtains on the condition of confidentiality and
solely for the purpose of generating new evidence, unless the provider of the
information consents.").
123. Article 67(2) requires that the prosecutor disclose "as soon as practi-
cable" evidence that "shows or tends to show the innocence of the ac-
cused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect the
credibility of prosecution evidence." Rome Statute, supra note 3.
124. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1486, Decision on
the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials Covered by
Article 54(3) (e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the Prosecution of
the Accused, Together with Certain Other Issues Raised at the Status Confer-
ence on 10 June 2008, ¶ 73 (Jun. 13, 2008), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Cour-
tRecords/CR2008_05884.PDF.
125. Id. ¶ 92 (noting that, because the prosecution's non-disclosure ex-
tended to the Trial Chamber, the Chamber was "unable to determine
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shortcoming that, standing alone, suggests that the OTP was
operating as a "mere party with a narrowly defined aim for the
overall outcome of the proceedings," rather than as a Court
organ with an obligation to establish the truth.1 26 In addition,
the confidentiality agreements were made with the United Na-
tions and various non-governmental organizations, 12 7 entities
that are not required to seek out exonerating or mitigating
evidence.128 Accordingly, there was an identifiable lack of ob-
jectivity in the OTP's investigation because none of the on-the-
ground investigatory work was conducted in accordance with
the Statute's 54(1) (a) requirements.129 In addition, ongoing
reliance on evidence provided by external entities continues
to affect the "objectivity" of current investigations-if perhaps
to a lesser extent.130
whether or not the non-disclosure of this potentially exculpatory material
constitutes a violation of the right to a fair trial").
126. See, e.g., Behrens, supra note 117, at 438-39 (1998) (contending that
it is the combination of the statutory requirement to seek out exonerating
evidence equally, the prosecution's ability to launch an appeal on the ac-
cused's behalf, and the duty to disclose exonerating and mitigating evidence
that contributes to the conclusion that the ICC Prosecutor "has the duty to
establish, to the best of his powers, the truth" as an organ of the Court).
127. Heikelina Verrijn Stuart, The ICC in Trouble, 6J. INT'L GRIM. JUST. 409,
409-417 (2008); see also Katy Glassborow, ICC Investigative Strategy Under Fire,
INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING (Oct. 27, 2008), https://iwpr.net/global-
voices/icc-investigative-strategy-under-fire.
128. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS NGOs IN RELA-
TION TO ICC INVESTIGATIONS 3 (2004) (noting that NGOs frequently "call for
accountability of perpetrators as one way of addressing the violations" and,
despite the focus of the paper, making no mention of the obligation to seek
exonerating evidence). See also Caroline Buisman, Delegating Investigations:
Lessons to the Learned from the LubangaJudgment, 11 Nw. J. INT'L HUM RTs. 30,
55 (2013) (noting that OTP has relied more on the work of NGOs and the
United Nations than their own investigations and that these organizations
are not required to seek out exonerating evidence).
129. Stuart, supra note 127, at 414 (noting that, by 2008, these types of
investigations were "still a minor factor").
130. More recently, the ICC OTP has acknowledged that its "limited field
presence" requires it to rely on so-called "first responders" to obtain evi-
dence. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT [ICC], STRATEGIC
PLAN JUNE 2012 -2015, 1 48 (2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/
OTP-Strategic-Plan-2013.pdf. While the OTP aims to enhance its field pres-
ence, it simultaneously intends "to explore how new forms of cooperation
would allow the Office to directly access evidence that has been identified by
these first responders." Id. See also Carsten Stahn & Dov Jacobs, The Interac-
tion Between Human Rights Factfinding and International Criminal Proceedings:
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Moreover, patent objectivity shortcomings have arisen
within OTP-led investigations conducted in situ. For example,
in the Mbarushimana case, the Pre Trial Chamber identified
behavior directly at odds with the prosecution's obligation to
seek exonerating evidence. In fact, the Chamber derided OTP
investigators for interview techniques that created "the impres-
sion that the investigator is so attached to his or her theory or
assumption that he or she does not refrain from putting ques-
tions in leading terms and from showing resentment, impa-
tience or disappointment whenever the witness replies in
terms which are not entirely in line with his or her expecta-
tions."131 The Chamber further described the techniques as
"utterly inappropriate when viewed in light of the objective, set
out in Article 54(1) (a), to establish the truth by 'investigating
incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally." 132
Other OTP-run investigations have similarly been criti-
cized for their failure to adequately test the incriminating in-
formation gathered, 133 although this clearly ought to be an in-
herent aspect of the objectivity mandate. In fact, and of partic-
ular significance regarding the admissibility of recorded
statements, the ICC Prosecution openly acknowledged in 2013
that "it is not always possible [for it] to investigate and find
corroboration for witness accounts."134 Notably, this statement
Toward a (New) Typology, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF HuMAN RIGHTS FACr-
FINDrNc 255, 261 (Philip Alston & Sarah Knuckey eds., 2015) (noting the
unresolved question of "to what extent the direct use of findings from vari-
ous third parties can constitute an investigation within the meaning of Arti-
cle 54").
131. Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision
on the Confirmation of Charges, 1 51 (Dec. 16, 2011), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/pages/record.aspx?uri=1286409.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Buisman, supra note 115, at 215-16 (maintaining that the
OTP has consistently failed to corroborate its witnesses and citing its failure
to confirm the ages of so-called child soldiers in the Lubanga and Katanga/
Ngidjolo cases as examples of this).
134. Simon Jennings, ICC Under Fire Over Investigations, INST. FOR WAR &
PEACE REPORTING (Mar. 22, 2013), https://iwpr.net/global-voices/icc-under-
fire-over-investigations (quoting OTP). See also Karim A.A. Khan & Anand A.
Shah, Defensive Practices: Representing Clients Before the International Criminal
Court, 27 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 191, 221 (2014) (maintaining that OTP
failed to contact those named by its witnesses as having attended three meet-
ings central to the Prosecution's case, despite the accessibility of these per-
sons).
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was made after the OTP had examined the relevant witnesses at
trial, and in response to criticism from the designated Trial
Chamber that the witnesses' "remarks were too contradictory
or too hazy, too imprecise" for the Trial Chamber to base its
decision on their testimony.1 3 5
In light of these examples and observations, it is little sur-
prise that one member of the defense bar has described the
requirement that the prosecution investigate incriminating
and exonerating circumstances equally as a "nice provision"
that is nevertheless "meaningless in practice." 3 6 In fact, ICC
Judge Ozaki's observations regarding the witness statements
obtained in ICC investigations endorse this view, while draw-
ing a distinct parallel to the taking of ICTY witness state-
ments.' 3 7 Specifically, Judge Ozaki notes, "[W]itness state-
ments at the ICC are not taken in neutral, impartial circum-
stances."' 3 8 Rather, "[t]hey are taken by a party (often by an
investigator) mainly in order to gather evidence to mount a
case against an accused, and without the supervision of any
impartial arbiter."'3 9
Finally, although the principle of objectivity seemingly
ought to temper the prosecutor's adversarial role at trial, here
again the ICC Prosecutor is aligned completely (and, indeed,
openly) with her ICTY analogue. One might expect otherwise,
because the current Prosecutor interprets Article 54(1) (a) to
mean that "the prosecution is not merely a party to the pro-
ceedings, but an organ of the administration of justice."1 4 0 If
this role, as noted elsewhere, imposes "an obligation to assist
135. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Transcript of
Hearing to Deliver the Decision Pursuant to Article 74, 7 (Dec. 18, 2012). In
fact, in its hearing on compensation for Ngudjolo, his counsel maintained
that the prosecution "sidelined" those witnesses whose accounts were excul-
patory for the accused. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07,
Transcript of Compensation Hearing, 6 (Nov. 23, 2015).
136. Jackson & Brunger, supra note 118, at 181 (quoting Respondent 4).
137. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
138. Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Dissenting Opinion
ofJudge Kuniko Ozaki on the Decision on the Admission into Evidence of
Materials Contained in the Prosecution's List of Evidence, 1 11 (Nov. 23,
2010), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2010_10732.pdf.
139. Id.
140. Fatou Bensouda, The ICC Statute-An Insider's Perspective on a Sui
Generis System for Global justice, 36 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 277, 280
(2011).
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the court in discovering the truth,"'141 it appears to follow that
"the Prosecutor is not only to investigate but also to present
exonerating circumstances during trial."1 42 Importantly, how-
ever, the ICC Prosecution has emphatically refuted this inter-
pretation, maintaining that it "conflates the Prosecution's duty
to investigate 'incriminating and exonerating circumstances
equally' under article 54(1) (a) with the Prosecution's discre-
tion and indeed, obligation, to present its best possible case."143
With regard to written witness statements, then, one should
expect the ICC Prosecutor, like her ICTY counterpart, to use
the available rules in a way that puts the best gloss on the pros-
ecution's evidence.
In sum, despite claims of neutrality and purportedly non-
partisan evidence-gathering, the ICC OTP has established its
likeness to its adversarial predecessor in every way that matters,
in particular with respect to the use of untested witness testi-
mony. Just as the ICTY Appeals Chamber concluded that "con-
siderable emphasis" must be placed upon the need to ensure
the reliability of written statements given to ICTY investigators
by prospective witnesses "as questions concerning the reliabil-
ity of such statements have unfortunately arisen,"'1 4 4 So too
have ICC investigations produced comparable concerns. In ef-
fect, virtually all the available evidence supports the finding
that ICC investigations and trials are as adversarial as their
ICTY analogues. As a result, the due-process oriented criti-
cisms stemming from party-generated evidence that follow ap-
ply with equal effect at the ICC, and run the same risks of un-
dermining both the fairness of ICC proceedings and their per-
ceived legitimacy.
141. C6td, supra note 112, at 326 (internal citation omitted).
142. Kirsch, supra note 111, at 286 (internal citation omitted). This would
be consistent with the professed role of a Continental prosecutor, who is
charged with the mandate "to present the case to the court in a neutral
manner." Weigend, supra note 104, at 381. Weigend later notes that this rosy
view differs from reality, in which the Continental prosecutor assumes the
role of partisan advocate by the time of trial. Id. at 382.
143. Prosecutor v. Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12-292, Prosecution's Re-
sponse to Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui's Request for Compensation, 1 42 (Sept.
18, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015-17750.pdf.
144. Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocu-
tory Appeal Concerning Rule 92 bis (C), 1 30 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the For-
mer Yugoslavia June 7, 2002) (citations omitted) (attributing this to "the
manner in which those written statements are compiled").
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
[Vol. 50:75104
PROBLEM OF WITNESS STATEMENTS
V. ICTY RULE 92 BIs/ICC RuLE 68(2)(B)
A. Fairness Concerns
The first important lesson for the ICC regarding the deci-
sion to import Rule 92 bis into its RPE (as Rule 68(2) (b)), is
that the rule's acts and conduct restriction-placed in the pro-
vision to temper the potential unfairness of admitting party-
generated witness statementsl 4 5 -has at best afforded incom-
plete protection in practice. This is because the limiting lan-
guage, on its terms, does not capture written testimony that
addresses the conduct of others. Consequently, this latter type
of written evidence may be fully admissible under the rule,
even though it could prove central to establishing the guilt of
the accused. As Judge Wald explained, the restriction can pro-
vide "an ephemeral distinction since a big chunk of Tribunal
jurisprudence uses a command responsibility or joint criminal
enterprise theory to convict accuseds under which they are
held responsible for the acts of subordinates, or those with
whom they collaborate." 14 6 Zahar echoes this concern, describ-
ing the protection afforded by the rule as "illusory" for joint
criminal enterprise cases. In his view, "to enable admission of
the bulk of the necessary evidence within the trial's time con-
straints and mostly without cross-examination-an invented
distinction must be maintained between evidence 'directly'
speaking to the actions of the accused, and evidence going to
the conduct of a person other than the accused."' 4 7
These criticisms have merit, as the ICTY has adopted a
literal interpretation of the Rule 92 bis limitation. Under this
construction, untested witness statements can be used to
demonstrate the guilt of the accused by, for example, estab-
lishing the conduct of another for which the accused is alleged
responsible based on shared membership in a joint criminal
enterprise (JCE) .148 As the Milosevic Chamber explained:
145. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
146. Patricia M. Wald, Rules of Evidence in the Yugoslav War Tribunal, 21
QuINNIPIAc L. REv 761, 769 (2003) (concluding that "almost all the evidence
could be said to go to the conduct or role of the accused").
147. Alexander Zahar, Pluralism and the Rights of the Accused in International
Criminal Proceedings, in PLURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw, supra
note 118, at 225, 242-43.
148. Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocu-
tory Appeal Concerning Rule 92 bis (C) 1 10 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the For-
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The phrase "acts and conduct of the accused" in Rule
92 bis is a plain expression and should be given its
ordinary meaning: deeds and behaviour of the ac-
cused. It should not be extended by fanciful interpre-
tation. No mention is made of acts and conduct by
alleged co-perpetrators, subordinates or, indeed, of
anybody else. Had the rule been intended to extend
to acts and conduct of the alleged co-perpetrators or
subordinates it would have said so. 1 4 9
This interpretation was later affirmed by the Appeals Chamber
in a decision that elaborates on the observations in Milorevic
and illustrates how narrow the acts and conduct restriction can
be in application. According to the majority decision, because
a broad interpretation of the limiting language would "effec-
tively denude [the rule] of any real utility,"1 50 the term "acts
and conduct of the accused" applies only to evidence that goes
directly to the actus reus or mens rea of the accused or to show-
ing "that [the accused] was a superior to those who actually
did commit the crimes."1 5 1 Consequently, the rule places no
restriction on what 92 bis evidence establishes indirectly. In
fact, the decision notes that the prosecution may use 92 bis
statements that address the acts and conducts of others to es-
tablish the mens rea required to convict the accused.1 5 2 Al-
though the decision noted "the short step," in superior re-
sponsibility cases, between the acts constituting the crime
charged and a finding that the accused knew or had reason to
know of those acts, the decision suggested that this might con-
mer Yugoslavia June 7, 2002) (noting that 92 bis'acts and conduct limitation
applies in cases ofJCE to written evidence that indicates the accused partici-
pated in the JCE or that he "shared with the person who actually did commit
the crimes charged the requisite intent for those crimes").
149. Prosecutor v. Milogevic, Case No. IT-02-54, Decision on Prosecution's
Request to Have Written Statements Admitted Under Rule 92 bis, 1 22 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 21, 2002).
150. Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocu-
tory Appeal Concerning Rule 92 bis (C) 1 9 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia June 7, 2002).
151. Id. 1 10.
152. Id. 1 11 (explaining that, to establish the accused's mens rea, "the
prosecution may rely on the acts and conduct of others which have been
proved by Rule 92 bis statements"). See also Daryl A. Mundis, Current Develop-
ments at the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 197,
218 (commenting on the decision).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
[Vol. 50:75106
PROBLEM OF WITNESS STATEMENTS
stitute an appropriate use of Rule 92 bis, even in cases where
the declarant is unavailable for in-person examination.155
Despite this concession that important Rule 92 bis evi-
dence might be admitted untested, cross-examination was, at
least initially, permitted whenever the contents of a 92 bis state-
ment addressed a disputed issue. 154 In addition, some Tribu-
nal case law even suggested that cross-examination was required
whenever 92 bis evidence was "pivotal" to the case against the
accused. 155 For example, according to the Limaj Trial Cham-
ber, "[W]hen a written statement touches upon the very es-
sence of the prosecution case against the accused, the witness
should be available for cross-examination."15 6 This seemingly
rights-protective assertion merits several important observa-
tions.
First, it shows how far the application of Rule 92 bis
strayed from its avowed goal of facilitating admission of back-
ground or peripheral evidence. 15 7 If anything, evidence that
"touches upon the very essence of the prosecution's case"
seems the antithesis of that which is background or peripheral.
Rather, the fact that Rule 92 bis evidence can have this core
153. Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocu-
tory Appeal Concerning Rule 92 bis (C) 1 14 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the For-
mer Yugoslavia June 7, 2002). In such cases, the Appeals Chamber notes that
"it may well be" that the evidence should not be admitted in written form or
that an absence of the opportunity to cross should preclude admission of
such statements. Id. 1 15.
154. Robinson, supra note 58, at 1041-42. See alsoJackson, supra note 64,
at 30 ("At first the chambers were cautious in applying this rule but over
time they have been prepared to admit written statements without cross-ex-
amination over the objection of the defense and the rule has been used to
admit large amounts of evidence that would otherwise have had to be led in
chief.").
155. Indeed, this was Judge Robinson's avowed preference: "[I]n my view
... [when] statements expose the accused to liability in relation to a critical
element of the Prosecution's case, cross-examination is not at the discretion
of the Trial Chamber." Prosecutor v. Milogevic, Case No. IT-02-54, Decision
on Prosecution's Request to Have Written Statements Admitted Under Rule
92 bis, Separate Opinion of Judge Patrick Robinson, I 10 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 21, 2002).
156. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Decision on Prosecutor's
Third Motion for Provisional Admission of Written Evidence in Lieu of Viva
Voce Testimony Pursuant to Rule 92 bis, ¶ 6 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the For-
mer Yugoslavia Mar. 9, 2005).
157. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing the Tribunal's
avowed rationale for adopting the rule).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
20171 107
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
quality demonstrates that a statement not directed at an ac-
cused can nevertheless "contribute strongly to the impression
that he is guilty."15 8 Second, it demonstrates the Tribunal's
recognition that cross-examination and the truth-seeking ben-
efits that derive from the sheer presence of a live witness159 are
important in ensuring the integrity of its trials. As was true of
the limitations adopted for the rule, 160 this awareness is tied
both to Tribunal experience and to theoretical concerns stem-
ming from the Tribunal's adversarial framework. Judge Wald,
for example, admitted she "gr[ew] suspicious" of out-of-court
witness statements involving multiple translations, noting the
"margin for error in such a system" and that "in the courtroom
years later, many witnesses say they were misunderstood or
misquoted in the earlier statement. "161
The Milutinovic trial provides an illustrative example of
the important connection between witness presence and cross-
examination and the Tribunal's truth-seeking function. In that
matter, the prosecution unsuccessfully attempted to submit
"80 or 90" Rule 92 bis statements authored by witnesses with
whom the prosecution's lawyers had not met, and all without
the prospect of in-person examination. 162 After some of the
158. Wald, supra note 12, at 551.
159. See Patricia M. Wald, ICTY judicial Proceedings-An Appraisal from
Within, 2 J. INT'L CRiM. JusT. 466, 473 (2004) ("Donning a robe does not
enshroud its occupant with a seventh sense of whether something written on
a piece of paper is true.").
160. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (noting reliability
problems with some of the prosecution's written witness statements).
161. Wald, supra note 12, at 551. Similarly, witness preparation has fre-
quently unearthed mistakes and omissions in statements obtained with the
help of translators and then summarized by prosecution investigators. Col-
leen M. Rohan, Protecting the Rights of the Accused in International Criminal Pro-
ceedings: Lip Service or Affirmative Action?, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPAN-
ION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVEs 289, 300 (Wil-
liam A. Schabas et al. eds., 2013). Notably, the ICC Prosecutor has argued
for witness proofing on these very grounds. See Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case
No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Prosecution's Request for Authorisation to Conduct
Witness Preparation, 1 11 (June 17, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Cour-
tRecords/CR2016_04399.PDF (maintaining that witness proofing can facili-
tate the use of written evidence because it provides a pretrial opportunity to
correct inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the proposed Rule 68 state-
ments).
162. In response to judicial questioning as to why lawyers had not been
sent to meet with the associated witnesses in the field, OTP responded by
saying their initial plan was to tender the witnesses' written statements pursu-
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related witnesses had been called, Judge Bonomy noted in
open court that "there could have been the greatest miscar-
riage of justice if the[] witnesses had not been available for
cross-examination." 163
This observation buttresses Judge Wald's position that, if
untested out-of-court statements are to be admitted, they must
"truly be limited to non-incriminating evidence."16 4 Indeed,
while the cross-examination authorized in Milutinovic en-
hanced the fairness of that trial, not all ICTY Trial Chambers
have been equally sensitive to the potential for injustice cre-
ated by admitting untested, incriminatory written evidence. In
fact, the prosecution's representative in Milutinovic noted that
a different Trial Chamber had been much more lenient in
permitting its use of comparable, untested Rule 92 bis evi-
dence. 163 This inconsistency among Chambers is hardly sur-
prising. Even those Trial Chambers that agree with the Limaj
Trial Chamber's pronouncement above, an approach aligned
with each chamber's obligation to ensure a fair trial, 166 might
disagree as to whether a specific Rule 92 bis statement falls
within the "very essence" category that requires cross-examina-
tion. Among other factors, the efficiency concerns that
prompted the rule's creation might, consciously or otherwise,
affect a chamber's discretionary assessment in this regard. 16 7
ant to 92 bis, without cross-examination, citing this fact as "one reason that
those people weren't seen." Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Case No. IT-05-87-T,
Transcript, 2675 (Aug. 31, 2006), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/pavkovic/
trans/en/060831IT.htm.
163. Id. at 2675-76.
164. Wald, supra note 12, at 551 (attributing this position to the unreliable
nature in which out of court statements are obtained and the frequent sub-
sequent denials and corrections of the statements' authors when called to
testify).
165. In response to Judge Bonomy's assessment that the prosecution was
naive to believe that the Milutinovic Trial Chamber would admit the pro-
posed, untested 92 bis evidence, the prosecutor responded by noting that
"it's not naive on my part based on the experience in the other case that I
worked on in the tribunal"). Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Case No. IT-05-87-T,
Transcript, at 2676.
166. ICTIY Statute, supra note 7, art. 20(1).
167. As Caianiello notes, there is "a constant temptation to consider items
of evidence as not being crucial, just because they do not directly affect the
acts and conduct of the accused." Caianiello, supra note 45, at 405. See also
Rohan, supra note 161, at 298 (analogously describing "a relatively lenient
assessment" regarding Rule 92 bis admissibility as "a foreseeable event given
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Moreover, even if the Limaj Trial Chamber's pronouncement
constitutes the "best case law" on the topic, 16 8 it has no bind-
ing effect on the work of other trial chambers.' 69 In fact, other
chambers have at times approached the matter differently. For
example, another trial decision maintains instead that
"whether the evidence in question relates to a 'critical element
of the Prosecution's case, or to a live and important issue be-
tween the parties'" is simply "an important consideration" in
determining whether to require the witness to appear for
cross-examination. 170
In addition, and irrespective of the test imposed, Trial
Chambers may erroneously deny cross-examination simply be-
cause their 92 bis rulings are based on party-provided informa-
tion. In the Martic case, for example, the Trial Chamber ac-
knowledged that cross-examination is a necessary counter-bal-
ance whenever Rule 92 bis statements include "evidence
pivotal to the prosecution's case."1 71 The decision then went
on to consider the admissibility of multiple 92 bis state-
ments,172 including one that, according to the prosecution's
submission, addressed only background information and was
"largely cumulative with the evidence that will be presented
the political pressures placed on the ad hoc tribunals to complete the cases
before them within a specified period of time").
168. Caianiello, supra note 45, at 404 n.50 (maintaining that "most cases"
have maintained this line of protection).
169. The finding of one trial chamber has no binding force on the deci-
sions of other trial chambers. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-
A, Judgment, 1 114 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24,
2000) (noting, however, that trial chambers are free to follow the decisions
of one another).
170. Prosecutor v. -Dordcevit, Case No.IT- 05-87/1-T, Decision on Prosecu-
tor's Motion for Admission of Transcripts of Evidence of Forensic Witnesses
in Lieu of Viva Voce Testimony Pursuant to Rule 92 bis, 1 7 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 11, 2009).
171. Prosecutor v. Martic, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Decision on Prosecutor's
Motion for the Admission of Written Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92 bis of the
Rules, 1 14 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 16, 2006). See
also id. ("[W]here the individual, whose acts and conduct are described in
the statement, is so proximate to the accused and where the evidence is so
pivotal to the Prosecution case, the Trial Chamber may decide (i) not to
admit the statement at all, or (ii) to require the witness to appear for cross-
examination.").
172. The Trial Chamber simultaneously considered the prosecution's mo-
tion to introduce eleven other witness statements and associated documents
and seven transcripts. Id. 1 1.
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during the trial through live witnesses."173 Citing to this party-
provided information, the Martic Trial Chamber admitted the
statement without the benefit of cross-examination.1 7 4 On ap-
peal, however, and with the advantage of a full record, the Ap-
peals Chamber fully rejected the prosecution's characteriza-
tion of the statement, finding that its ultimately uncorroborated
contents were so pivotal to establishing the accused's responsi-
bility on multiple counts charged in the indictment175 that its
admission constituted a "miscarriage of justice."17 6 In other
words, the facts from Martic suggest that the Trial Chamber
based its 92 bis ruling on party-provided (mis)information, a
fact that reveals yet another shortcoming associated with the
rule's implementation, and one that is specifically tied to the
ICTY's adversarial structure. As Judge Robinson warned, be-
cause Tribunal judges do not have "an information-rich dos-
sier, as is the case in civil-law jurisdictions, mistakes may be
made by Trial Chambers in determining whether to allow
cross-examination." 77
B. Rule 92 bis: A Retrospective
Considering the noted shortcomings of Rule 92 bis, it
makes sense to examine the frequency with which the rule has
been used, both to form an appreciation for its potential im-
pact on the fairness of ICTY proceedings and to gauge its ef-
173. Id. 1 20.
174. Id.
175. Prosecutor v. Martic, Case No. IT-95-11-A, Judgement, ¶ 193 n.486
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2008) (noting, in addi-
tion, that the statement of Antun Bla2evi6-known earlier as "Witness MM-
019"-was insufficiently corroborated by other evidence).
176. Id. (concluding that Martic's related JCE convictions were conse-
quently reversible).
177. Robinson, supra note 58, at 1042 (internal citation omitted). Robin-
son goes on to note that the discretionary authority to allow for cross-exami-
nation "is more consistent with the civil-law system in which judges have a
substantial role in questioning witnesses, [and that it therefore] has the po-
tential to lead to unfairness to the accused, because the ICTY Judge, unlike
his civil law counterpart, does not have a full knowledge of the facts of the
case, and may err in the exercise of his discretion to allow cross-examina-
tion." Id. at 1043. Cf Caianiello, supra note 45, at 408. Cainiello seems opti-
mistic that ICC judges will not encounter comparable difficulties, but ap-
pears to overlook that the judges must depend upon party representations in
making their determinations.
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fect on efficiency. With respect to use, it was noted early on
that Rule 92 bis "appears to have had a dramatic impact on the
way in which parties, and in particular the Prosecution, are
seeking to present their cases before the International Tribu-
nal." 178 For example, by 2003, the number of witness state-
ments admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis in the Krajisnik case
significantly outnumbered those witnesses who delivered in-
person testimony.179 Around the same time, the Prosecution
began to undertake so-called "92 bis missions,"1 s0 employing
multiple such undertakings in the Hadzihasanovic & Kubura
matter with the aim of amassing "35 to 40 Rule 92 bis wit-
nesses."181 Ultimately, these missions merited inclusion in the
Tribunal's Annual Reports to the Security Council and Gen-
eral Assembly,182 which note that more than fifty such endeav-
ors occurred between 2008 and 2015.183 In addition to these
178. Gideon Boas, Developments in the Law of Procedure and Evidence at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International
Criminal Court, 12 CRIM. L. F. 167, 176 (2001) (noting, in particular, the Pros-
ecution's 92 bis application in the Krajisnik case, which identified approxi-
mately 170 witnesses). In its subsequent report, the Tribunal observed that
the rule has become increasingly implemented. Int'l Crim. Trib. for the For-
mer Yugoslavia [ICTY], Ninth Ann. Rep. of the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanita-
rian Law in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 1 82, U.N. Doc. A/
57/379-S/2002/985 (Sept. 4, 2002). Id. 1 289 ("During the reporting pe-
riod, rule 92 his ... has been increasingly implemented in several cases.").
See also Robinson, supra note 58, at 1042 (noting that "[t] rials rely heavily on
this Rule").
179. Rohan, supra note 161, at 298 (noting that the former outpaced the
latter by 168 to 101).
180. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Transcript,
20967 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 7, 2003) (discussing
a Rule 92 bis mission then being conducted in Sarajevo).
181. Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Status Confer-
ence Transcript, 235 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 6,
2003).
182. Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY], Fourteenth Ann.
Rep. of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Seri-
ous Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, 1 103, U.N. Doc. A/62/172-S/2007/469 (Aug. 4,
2007) [hereinafter Fourteenth Ann. ICTY Report]. These annual reports are
statutorily required. See ICTY Statute, supra note 7, art. 34
183. Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY], Fifteenth Ann. Rep.
of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of the Former Yugosla-
via Since 1991, 1 97, U.N. Doc. A/63/210-S/2008/515 (Aug. 4, 2008) (re-
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developments, ICTY Trial Chambers adopted the unofficial
practice of "partial bissing," by redacting more sensitive mater-
ials from written statements, such as information relating to
the acts and conduct of the accused, and admitting the re-
maining portions in lieu of oral testimony.184
This hearty use of 92 bis suggests increased efficiency, con-
sistent with the expectation that the provision "would have the
effect of shortening trial duration by reducing the number of
live witnesses at trial," 185 which, of course, was the original ra-
tionale for adopting the rule. 86 Yet, even assuming that in-
porting nine 92 bis missions); Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
[ICTY], Seventeenth Ann. Rep. of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, ¶ 88, U.N. Doc. A/65/205-S/
2010/413 (July 30, 2010) (reporting seven 92 bis missions); Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY], Eighteenth Ann. Rep. of the International Tri-
bunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 1 84, U.N.
Doc. A/66/210-SS/2011/473 (July 31, 2011) (reporting nine 92 bis mis-
sions); Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY], Nineteenth Ann.
Rep. of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Seri-
ous Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, ¶ 96, U.N. Doc. A/67/214-S/2012/592 (Aug. 1, 2012)
(reporting ten 92 bis missions); Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
[ICTY], Twentieth Ann. Rep. of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, ¶ 76, U.N. Doc. A/68/255-S/
2013/463 (Aug. 2, 2013) (reporting eleven 92 bis missions); Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY], Twenty-First Ann. Rep. of the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 1
63, U.N. Doc. A/69/225-S/2014/556 (Aug. 1, 2014) (reporting four 92 bis
missions); Twenty-Second Ann. Rep. of the International Tribunal for the Prosecu-
tion ofPersons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 1 67, U.N. Doc. A/70/226-
S/2015/585 (July 31, 2015) (reporting three 92 bis missions).
184. O-Gon Kwon, The Challenge of an International Criminal Trial as Seen
from the Bench, 5 J. INr'L CRuM. JUsT. 360, 368 (2007).
185. Mdximo Langer & Joseph W. Doherty, Managerial Judging Goes Inter-
national, But Its Promise Remains Unfulfilled: An Empirical Assessment of the ICTY
Reforms, 36 YALE J. INT'L L. 241, 269 (2011).
186. See Geoffrey Nice & Philippe Vallihres-Roland, Procedural Innovations
in War Crimes Trials, 3 J. INT'L GRIM. JUST. 354 (2005) ("The rule was intro-
duced to facilitate the introduction of written evidence in order to expedite
trials, at a time when the Tribunal was beginning fully to realise the perils of
even mid-level and low-level perpetrators' trials, which were lasting in excess
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court time has been saved,187 one must also factor in the time
the rule requires both out of court and in the pretrial phase.
Indeed, out-of-court time is likely to be significant for a num-
ber of reasons, including the fact that Rule 92 bis statements
must be read twice: first for the purpose of admission and later
as evidence.18 The judges may also have to read any number
of "associated documents"s9 in a "92 bis witness package,"'9 o
compounding the non-court time consumed by the rule and
raising questions about the judges' ability to meaningfully con-
sider an ever-increasing amount of material in their eventual
decision-making.191
Moreover, the assumption that the rule has saved in-court
time is open to question. Although the Tribunal appears not
of one year, with the most complicated leadership cases still ahead."); see also
BoAS, supra note 82, at 65.
187. Office of Internal Oversight Services [OIOS], Assignment No.
AA2008/270/01-Audit of the ICTY Completion Strategy, 1 46 (Oct. 29,
2008) [hereinafter OIOS 2008 Audit] (describing the average testimony
times for 92 bis witnesses as "significantly less" as compared to viva voce wit-
nesses).
188. ALEXANDER ZAHAR & GORAN SLUITER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMrNAL LAW
345, n.135 (2007).
189. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ratic, Case No. IT-98-32/1-R77.2, Decision on
Prosecution's Motion for Admission of Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92 bis, 1
12 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2011) (considering
that the "documents associated with the [92 bis] statements form inseparable
and indispensable parts thereof . . . and may therefore be admitted into
evidence pursuant to Rule 92 bis").
190. Prosecutor v. Mladic, Case No. IT-09-92-T, Decision on Prosecution
Motion to Admit Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92 bis, 1 2 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Jun. 28, 2013) (considering "a Rule 92 bis witness
package consisting of an amalgamated statement of Witness RM-159's prior
testimonies and statements and eight associated exhibits").
191. See Zahar, supra note 147, at 246 ("It is not humanly possible for the
judges to give individual attention to each piece of evidence."). Judge Ozaki
raises a similar concern when contemplating a comparable move at the ICC,
stating that "increasing the amount of documentation in the case record
may create potential problems caused by the sheer volume and possible in-
compatibility of the material's content, thereby increasing the risk of confu-
sion in the drafting of the judgment in the case." Prosecutor v. Bemba
Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kuniko Ozaki on
the Decision on the Admission into Evidence of Materials Contained in the
Prosecution's List of Evidence, 1 28 (Nov. 23, 2010), https://www.icc-cpi.int
/CourtRecords/CR2010-10732.pdf.
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to have studied the issue,' 9 2 there is at least one empirical
analysis that considers more than five years of ICTY activity
with Rule 92 bis in place.' 9 3 Even though there are limits to
such an assessment,' 9 4 the study demonstrates that, despite the
introduction of Rule 92 bis and other efforts aimed at expedit-
ing Tribunal proceedings, ICTY pretrial and trial proceedings
during the period actually lasted longer.1 9 5 With respect to
Rule 92 bis in particular, one OTP member interviewed in rela-
tion to the study complained that the rule "takes a lot of time
in the pretrial phase."1 96 In addition, the study found that, de-
spite the increased use of written witness statements pursuant
to the rule, the number of live witnesses did not decline.' 9 7
This suggests that the parties used 92 bis to introduce more evi-
dence. This approach, of course, is fully consistent with the
tribunal's adversarial construct" and with the inference that
much of the written evidence was likely unnecessary. In effect,
the rule seems to have increased the admission of "evidential
debris" that "complicates and prolongs trials unnecessarily."1 99
Because this indicates that the procedural reform was un-
successfully implemented, one might propose that the answer
lies in Tribunal judges exercising greater managerial authority
192. An audit of the ICTY's completion strategy notes that, at least up
until March 2008, the Tribunal had not conducted an assessment regarding
whether the use of written evidence either saved court time or reduced the
overall length of cases. OIOS 2008 Audit, supra note 187, 1 45
193. The study considered data from April 26, 1995 until July 1, 2006.
Langer & Doherty, supra note 185, at 252. Recall that Rule 92 bis was
adopted in December 2000.
194. For example, the different nature of trials-in particular, "smaller
fish" versus "big fish"-cannot be readily accounted for in such a study. The
author is grateful to Fergal Gaynor for emphasizing this point.
195. Langer & Doherty, supra note 185, at 303. Id. at 267 ("[T]here are
strong reasons to think that the reforms [including Rule 92 bis] made the
trial longer.").
196. Id. at 269, n. 67.
197. Id. at 273.
198. GALvES ET AL., supra note 110, at 14 ("The presentation of cumula-
tive evidence is a large part of what's supposed to happen at trial. We pile up
the evidence on our side to reinforce its persuasive power."). As a result, the
U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence grant judges the discretion to exclude need-
lessly cumulative evidence. See FED. R. Evm. 403.
199. H.H. Judge Peter Murphy & Lina Baddour, Evidence and Selection of
judges in International Criminal Tribunals, in PLURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 118, at 368.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
2017] 115
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
over the rule.200 But, as the Martic example considered above
demonstrates, 201 there are real risks when Chambers exercise
these powers in an adversarial construct. By necessity, the
judges depend upon party representations and operate with-
out full knowledge of the case that will ultimately be
presented. 202 Critically, a less than fully-informed Trial Cham-
ber is the norm in ICTY proceedingS 203 and is to be expected
in a party-driven system (including that of the ICC). Conse-
quently, some Trial Chambers may have understandably (and
properly) erred on the side of fairness at the expense of effi-
ciency.20 4
Finally, one cannot overlook the time that Rule 92 bis-as-
sociated litigation has added to Tribunal proceedings, as "the
admission of each proposed non-viva voce witness is normally
litigated between the parties." 205 These observations map on
200. Langer & Doherty, supra note 185, at 284.
201. See supra notes 171-77 and accompanying text.
202. Langer & Doherty, supra note 185, at 284 ("With limited information,
the court risks making unfair or inefficient decisions-in other words, it
risks making decisions that may expedite the process but generate higher
costs in terms of accuracy, fairness, or any of the other goals of the legal
process . . . .").
203. In Milutinovic, for example, Judge Bonomy described the trial's pro-
gression as one where "we're going to limp from witness to witness, unsure
of what that witness's evidence will be until they come to court." Prosecutor v.
Milutinovic, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Transcript, 2675 (Aug. 31, 2006), http://
www.icty.org/x/cases/pavkovic/trans/en/0608311T.htm. While Bonomy's
criticism was directed at the prosecution's failure in that case to narrow
down its witnesses' proposed testimony in a timely fashion, the Tribunal's
adversarial framework in general presents an impediment to its Trial Cham-
bers' ability to exercise managerial authority, even with measures in place
designed to keep them better informed than their counterparts in a pure
adversarial system. As Damaska explains, when judges are only "partially in-
formed" about the case that is set to unfold, consequent managerial efforts
may be akin to those of a "blind and blundering intruder." Mirjan Dama~ka,
The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and Continental
Experiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 850 (1997) (borrowing the latter phrase
from Frankel).
204. Langer & Doherty, supra note 185, at 285 (positing that judges who
may not have all the relevant information to make an efficient and fair deci-
sion . . . may refrain from using their managerial powers over the parties").
205. ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 188, at 345 n.135 (further describing
this as a "time-consuming process"). See also McDermott, supra note 103, at
986-87 ("Many of the admissibility rules on written witness testimony in lieu
of viva voce evidence were introduced with a view to aiding expedience, but
have ironically on occasion added an extra layer of complexity in calling for
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to related practitioner interviews that identify party resistance
to the reform (and consequent strategic behavior designed to
neutralize its effect) as one of the two main reasons for its fail-
ure.206 This information, in turn, aligns with other research
that suggests international criminal defense counsel place a
high value on cross-examination, and view the increased use of
written witness statements without the prospect of cross-exami-
nation as "a major source of unfairness in trials before the
ICTY."20 7
C. Relevant ICC Practice
Although the ICC's application of revised Rule 68 is not
yet extensive, some noteworthy parallels can already be drawn
between the ICTY's Rule 92 bis experience and the Court's
Rule 68(2) (b) practice. First, the ICC Prosecution has consist-
ently advocated for the Court to adopt the Tribunal's narrow
interpretation of the "acts and conduct" limitation.208 Al-
though rulings on the issue appear to be scarce, 209 at least one
submissions on whether a statement goes to the acts and conduct of the
accused, whether cross-examination would be in the interests of justice, and
so forth, to such an extent that at times, it would have been more expedient
to call the witness to testify in person.").
206. Langer & Doherty, supra note 185, at 275. The authors also point to
judicial failure to implement the reforms effectively. Id. In this respect, see
Nice & ValliBres-Roland, supra note 186, at 368 (describing the "largely un-
favourable rulings of the Trial Chamber" in response to the prosecution's
attempt to use 92 bis in the Milofevic case).
207. Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Defense Perspectives on International Trials, 48
VA. J INT'L L. 529, 559 (2008) (noting that this view applies irrespective of
the type of system from which the attorney hails).
208. E.g., Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/15, Public Redacted Ver-
sion of "Prosecution Application to Conditionally Admit the Prior Recorded
Statements and Related Documents of [REDACTED] Under Rule 68(2) (b)
and the Prior Recorded Statements and Related Documents of [RE-
DACTED] Under Rule 68(3)," 1 14 (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_03092.PDF (noting that "[i]mportantly, acts
and conduct of the Accused must be distinguished from acts and conduct of
others who commit crimes for which the Accused is alleged responsible" and
contending that "proof of the latter is admissible under rule 68(2) (b)").
209. Regarding the Gbagbo matter in the preceding note, for example,
only one statement was admitted under Rule 68(2) (b), and its content did
not go to the acts and conduct of the accused. Accordingly, the statement
was admissible "regardless of whether a narrower or broader interpretation
is given to the expression 'acts and conduct of the accused.'" Prosecutor v.
Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/15, Decision on the Prosecutor's Application to In-
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Trial Chamber has already embraced the ICTY approach. In a
ruling reminiscent of the aforementioned Milosevic decision,
the Ongwen Chamber recently announced that Rule 68(2) (b)'s
acts and conduct language "must be interpreted in its plain
natural meaning, referring to the personal actions and omis-
sions of the accused, rather than a broader normative mean-
ing, extended to the actions and omissions of others which are
attributable to the accused under the modes of liability
charged by the Prosecution."2 1 0 In other words, the prosecu-
tion can now introduce unexamined witness statements to
prove the conduct of others, for which the accused is alleged
responsible, without the opportunity to examine the relevant
witness. While other Chambers need not follow the Ongwen
Chamber's lead, given the narrow interpretation's universal
acceptance at the ICTY and the position that a broad reading
of the limitation would "denude the rule of any real utility," 211
it seems likely that the prosecution will prevail in its call for a
similar interpretation in other cases. 212
This creates cause for concern, as ICC case law to date
demonstrates the prosecution's keen interest in utilizing the
sub-rule213 to preclude the prospect of cross-examination. 214
troduce Prior Recorded Testimony Under Rules 68(2)(b) and 68(3), 1 19
n.33 (Jun. 9, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016041
77.PDF.
210. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15, Decision on the Prosecu-
tion's Applications for Introduction of Prior Recorded Testimony under
Rule 68(2)(b) of the Rules, 1 11 (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/
CourtRecords/CR2016_25256.PDF.
211. Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocu-
tory Appeal Concerning Rule 92 bis (C) 1 9 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia June 7, 2002).
212. See, e.g, Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Public Redacted
Version of "Prosecution's Application Under Rule 68(2)(b) to Admit the
Prior Recorded Testimony of Witness P-0773," 1 14 (Dec. 20, 2016).
213. E.g., Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, No. ICCA02/04-01/15-465-Corr-
Red2, Public Lesser Redacted Version of "Corrected Version of 'Prosecu-
tion's Request for Introduction of Previously Recorded Testimony Pursuant
to Rule 68(2) (b) of the Rules,' 16 June 2016, ICC-02/04-01/15-465-Conf-
Corr," ¶ 1 (Dec. 5 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/
CR201625600.PDF (proposing that the Court conditionally admit, under
rule 68(2) (b), 38 prior recorded statements and their related documents).
214. This distinguishes ICC Rule 68(2)(b) from its ICTY forerunner,
which provides that "[t]he Trial Chamber shall decide, after hearing the
parties, whether to require the witness to appear for cross-examination; if it
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In the Gbagbo case, for example, the prosecution attempted to
use Rule 68(2) (b) to admit the written statements of three wit-
nesses and multiple associated documents,215 informing the
Chamber that the examination of the three proposed wit-
nesses was "unnecessary."2 16 The prosecutor's application also
downplayed the importance of the sub-rule's listed factors in
favor of admission-such as the cumulative nature of the state-
ment and that its contents are not in dispute2 17-maintaining
that these are simply designed to guide the Court in the exer-
cise of its discretion and "are not prerequisites for admission
under the rule."21 8 Simultaneously, however, the prosecution
argued that the Court should exercise its discretion in admit-
ting all three statements, because the statements did "not re-
late to disputed issues at the core of [the] case"219 and were
"of a cumulative and corroborative nature."2 20
Remarkably, the Gbagbo Chamber roundly disagreed with
virtually all of the prosecution's characterizations. First, it ex-
does so decide, the provisions of Rule 92 ter shall apply." ICTY RPE, Rule 92
bis (C), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.50 (July 8, 2015).
215. Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/15, Public Redacted Version of
"Prosecution Application to Conditionally Admit the Prior Recorded State-
ments and Related Documents of [REDACTED] Under Rule 68(2) (b) and
the Prior Recorded Statements and Related Documents of [REDACTED]
Under Rule 68(3)," I¶ 1-2 (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Cour-
tRecords/CR2016_03092.PDF (seeking to introduce the written statements
and associated documents of an additional eight witness pursuant to Rule
68(3)). ICC Rule 68(3) is discussed infra Part VI.
216. Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/15, Public Redacted Version of
"Prosecution Application to Conditionally Admit the Prior Recorded State-
ments and Related Documents of [REDACTED] Under Rule 68(2) (b) and
the Prior Recorded Statements and Related Documents of [REDACTED]
Under Rule 68(3)," 1 6 (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Cour-
tRecords/CR2016_03092.PDF (asserting that "the Parties and participants
will benefit from an expedited presentation of the Prosecution's case-in-
chief").
217. ICC RPE, supra note 6, Rule 68(2) (b) (i) (noting other factors, in-
cluding whether the statement relates to background information).
218. Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/15, Public Redacted Version of
"Prosecution Application to Conditionally Admit the Prior Recorded State-
ments and Related Documents of [REDACTED] Under Rule 68(2) (b) and
the Prior Recorded Statements and Related Documents of [REDACTED]
Under Rule 68(3)," ¶ 15 (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Cour-
tRecords/CR2016_03092.PDF.
219. Id. 1 32.
220. Id. 11 24, 28, 32.
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pressly found that two of the statements addressed "one of the
core and disputed issues" in the case and that the proposed
evidence could "reasonably assist the Chamber in [its] resolu-
tion" of the matter.221 Moreover, the Chamber rejected the
prosecution's claims that the statements were cumulative and
corroborated by other evidence. Instead, the Trial Chamber
observed that one of the proposed statements appeared to
contain a distinct, firsthand perspective,2 2 while another in-
cluded decidedly unique information from the only eyewitness
to a contested matter.223 In fact, while assessing the latter, the
Chamber refuted the prosecution's claim that another witness
had provided similar evidence, remarking that this ostensibly
corroborating witness was actually located "several kilometers
away" from the first's "crucial location." 224 In other words,
reminiscent of the Martic example at the ICTY, the prosecu-
tion mischaracterized its proposed written evidence in a way
that enhanced the likelihood of its admission.
Of course, from a fairness perspective, unlike the ICTY
Trial Chamber in Martic, the Gbabgo Chamber caught these
mischaracterizations before admitting the evidence, untested,
to the detriment of the accused.225 Yet, a complete compari-
221. Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/15, Decision on the Prosecu-
tor's Application to Introduce Prior Recorded Testimony Under Rules
68(2)(b) and 68(3), 1 15 (Jun. 9, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Cour-
tRecords/CR2016_04177.PDF. Accordingly, the Chamber concluded that
the evidence was "significant for the determination of core issues materially
in dispute" Id. 1 19. As noted, this is one of the listed factors a Chamber is
meant to consider when deciding upon the admissibility of a 68(2) (b) state-
ment. See ICC RPE, supra note 6, at Rule 68(2) (b) (i).
222. Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/15, Decision on the Prosecu-
tor's Application to Introduce Prior Recorded Testimony Under Rules
68(2)(b) and 68(3), 1 17 (Jun. 9, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Cour-
tRecords/CR201 604177.PDF.
223. Id. 1 16 ("There is no other witness on the Prosecutor's list who was
present at the relevant time in this area.").
224. Id.
225. Ultimately, the statements were admitted under ICC Rule 68(3).
Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/15 OA 8, Judgment on the
Appeals of Mr. Laurent Gbagbo and Mr. Charles Bl Goud6 Against the De-
cision of Trial Chamber I of 9 June 2016 Entitled "Decision on the Prosecu-
tor's Application to Introduce Prior Recorded Testimony Under Rules
68(2)(b) and 68(3)," ¶ 6 (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Cour-
tRecords/CR2016_24756.PDF. As discussed infra, Part VI, ICC Rule 68(3)
requires that the author of the written statement be present for examina-
tion.
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son ought also to consider that the Martic Chamber had to
assess the fairness of admitting twelve written statements with-
out the benefit of cross-examination, four times the number at
issue in Gbagbo. Accordingly, an increased volume of Rule
68(2) (b) submissions, such as the recent application to admit
thirty-eight statements in the Ongwen case, 22 6 could well
render a Trial Chamber more dependent upon the (partisan)
prosecution's representations. Indeed, the Gbagbo decision
demonstrates how the amount of out-of-court time required by
the use of 68(2) (b) may be substantial, particularly if Trial
Chambers are truly committed to ensuring that admitting the
unexamined statements will not interfere with the rights of the
accused.2 27
D. Summary
As the review of ICTY precedent makes clear, the acts and
conduct limitation in Rule 92 bis was initially designed to pro-
tect the fair trial rights of the accused. Nevertheless, Tribunal
practice quickly undermined the restriction's intended effect
by construing its limiting language literally rather than purpos-
ively. As a result, the prosecution could submit party-generated
evidence both to prove the acts of others for which the ac-
cused was alleged responsible, and even to (indirectly) estab-
lish the accused's mens rea for the crimes charged. Conse-
quently, even with its general commitment to ensuring that
Rule 92 bis evidence be corroborated, it is little wonder that
the acts and conduct limitation-and the protection it af-
fords-has been criticized by both bench and bar as "ephem-
226. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15, Decision on the Prosecu-
tion's Applications for Introduction of Prior Recorded Testimony under
Rule 68(2)(b) of the Rules, 1 1 (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/
CourtRecords/CR2016-25256.PDF.
227. Notably, the Gbagbo Chamber's consideration of just two such state-
ments required it to review not only the parties' submissions, but also the
purportedly similar evidence (a separate witness statement), the opening
statement of one of the accused, and prior defense questioning of one of the
prosecution's live witnesses. See Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/15,
Public Redacted Version of "Prosecution Application to Conditionally Admit
the Prior Recorded Statements and Related Documents of [REDACTED].
Under Rule 68(2) (b) and the Prior Recorded Statements and Related Docu-
ments of [REDACTED] Under Rule 68(3)," 1 17 (Apr. 26, 2016), https://
www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_03092.PDF.
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eral" and "illusory." 2 2 8 Nevertheless, rather than learn from
this history, at least one ICC Trial Chamber has embraced the
ICTY's approach to the acts and conduct limitation when ap-
plying Rule 68 (2) (b), rendering the Court vulnerable to simi-
lar critiques regarding its use.22 9 Should the ICC continue to
proceed in this direction, it ought to learn from Tribunal pre-
cedent in other ways. For example, Trial Chambers should
make clear that whenever the proposed witness statement ad-
dresses a critical element of the Prosecution's case or a live
and important issue, these are not simply "important consider-
ation [s]" regarding the question of cross-examination, as some
of the existing Tribunal case-law provides. 230 Instead, such fac-
tors-which ought not to be determined based solely on party
representations-should render the opportunity for witness
examination a prerequisite to admission.
Along these lines, at least one ICC Trial Chamber has
demonstrated an important and particular sensitivity to the
partisan nature of evidence presentation at the ICC and the
consequent need for (time-consuming) caution in assessing
the admissibility of written statements under the rule.2 31 This
might be seen as evidence that the Court has learned from
ICTY experience that it cannot simply rely on the prosecu-
tion's characterization of its evidence before dispensing with
critical reliability safeguards, such as the test of cross-examina-
tion. While this would certainly constitute a positive fair trial
development, the true test of the Court's commitment to this
228. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
229. Wald, supra note 159, at 473 (contending that the admission of "criti-
cal material without the ability to view and question the witness goes to the
heart of the process"). See also Maximo Langer, The Rise of ManagerialJudging
in International Criminal Law, 53 AM. J. Comp. L. 835, 908 n.370 (2005) (con-
cluding that "the use of written evidence has probably worsened the truth-
determination ability of ICTY trials").
230. Prosecutor v. -DorcTevi, Case No. IT-05-87/1-T, Decision on Prosecu-
tor's Motion for Admission of Transcripts of Evidence of Forensic Witnesses
in Lieu of Viva Voce Testimony Pursuant to Rule 92 bis, 1 7 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 11, 2009).
231. Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/15, Public Redacted Version of
"Prosecution Application to Conditionally Admit the Prior Recorded State-
ments and Related Documents of [REDACTED] Under Rule 68(2) (b) and
the Prior Recorded Statements and Related Documents of [REDACTED]
Under Rule 68(3)," 1 14 (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Cour-
tRecords/CR2016_03092.PDF.
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approach will only come in time and, notably, at the expense
of more efficient proceedings. Stated another way, this aspect
of the ICC's early 68(2) (b) jurisprudence highlights a critical
tension between the effort needed to make sure that the sub-
rule is fairly applied and its intended aim of expediting pro-
ceedings.232 When coupled with the empirical work of Langer
and Doherty on its sister provision at the ICTY233 and the com-
parably limited usefulness of 68(2) (b) evidence at the ICC, 23 4
the sub-rule's ability to expedite Court proceedings is, at best,
an open question.
VI. ICTY RULE 92 TER/ICC RULE 68(3)
A. The ICTY Experience
Another overlap between the Tribunal and the Court lies
in the parallel provisions of ICTY Rule 92 ter and ICC Rule
68(3), although the latter predates the former's adoption at
the ICTY.2 35 Both rules specifically sanction the introduction
of written witness statements that go directly to the acts or con-
duct with which the accused is charged, provided the declar-
ant appears at trial for examination.236 The ICTY rule codified
a practice first employed in the Slobodan Milosevic trial237 and,
232. Int'l Criminal Court [ICC], Study Group on Governance: Working Group
on Lessons Learnt: Second Rep. of the Court to the Assembly of States Parties, ICC-
ASP/12/37Add.1, [ 18 (Oct. 31, 2013), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
asp-docs/ASP12/ICC-ASP-12-37-Addl-ENG.pdf [hereinafter Study Group
on Governance, Second Rep.].
233. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
234. Int'l Bar Ass'n, Rule 68 Amendment Proposal (Nov. 12, 2013) (noting
that when an institution, like the ICTY, is prosecuting multiple cases arising
out of the same or related conflicts there can be a distinct benefit to a rule
like ICTY Rule 92 bis or ICC Rule 68(2) (b) but that "the usefulness of this
provision from one case to another before the ICC is likely to be more lim-
ited").
235. Under the ICC's original rules, Rule 68(b) permitted the use of pre-
viously recorded, unexamined testimony, provided that the witness agreed
and was available for examination at trial. ICC RPE, Rule 68 (b), ICC-ASP/
1/3 (2002). Under the revised rules, this provision now appears in Rule
68(3). ICC RPE, Rule 68(3), ICC-PIDS-LT-02-002/13-Eng (2013).
236. ICTY RPE, Rule 92 ter (A)-(B), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 39 (Sept. 26,
2006).
237. Prosecutor v. Milogevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.4, Decisions on In-
terlocutory Appeal on the Admissibility of Evidence-in-Chief in the Form of
Written Statements, 1 21 (Sept. 30, 2003) (endorsing the practice in gen-
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while that decision was controversial,238 the use of Rule 92 ter
has been less so. In this respect, it is first worth noting that the
rule might be described as more rights-protective than 92 bis.
Specifically, when one considers the narrow reach of 92 bis'
acts and conduct limitation,23 9 92 ter offers greater protection
to the accused because it provides for cross-examination as a
matter of right.24 0 Nevertheless, the provision has been criti-
cized for undermining the accused's right to a public trial, 241
as well as for the fact that its use precludes the judges from
making credibility determinations as to the prosecution's evi-
dence in chief.242
Rule 92 ter has also helped push the Tribunal towards
what might be described as an unwelcome reliance on written
evidence. This effect was most recently-and markedly-illus-
trated in the Karadfit trial. In that matter, a total of 195 prose-
cution witnesses were called, with only nineteen contributing
purely to the prosecution's case-in-chief by way of live testi-
mony.243 The remainder were admitted pursuant to 92 ter2 4 4
with a less extensive examination-in-chief. 245 In addition, more
eral, but leaving it to the Trial Chamber to perform an interests of justice
analysis with respect to the admissibility of each statement).
238. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milogevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.4, Dissenting
Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Admissibility of Evidence in Chief in the
Form of Written Statements, 11 6-7 (Oct. 21, 2003.) Hunt, the author of the
Galic opinion, reminded of the dangers of party-created evidence and noted
that concerns about fabrication and misrepresentation prompted the deci-
sion to limit 92 bis to written evidence to statements that did not address the
acts and conduct of the accused charged in the indictment. Id.
239. See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
240. Early versions of Rule 92 bis incorporated this discretionary aspect
entirely within the body of that rule. See, e.g., ICTY RPE, Rule 92 bis (E), U.N.
Doc. IT/32/Rev.19 (Jan. 19, 2001). The provisions later provided that, when
cross-examination is deemed required, 92 ter applies. ICTY RPE, Rule 92 bis
(C), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 50 (July 8, 2015).
241. See, e.g., Rohan, supra note 161, at 301-02 (noting that 92 ter state-
ments are "never revealed in open court" and can be accompanied by exhib-
its that "may or may not ever be mentioned, discussed, or be the subject of
examination in open court").
242. Kay, supra note 82, at 500.
243. Prosecutor v. Karadiie, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Public Redacted Ver-
dict ofJudgment on 24 March 2016, 1 6136 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016).
244. Id.
245. Prosecutor v. Karad2i, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Order on the Proce-
dure for the Conduct of Trial, 1¶ M-N, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
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than one hundred submissions were admitted under 92 bis.24 6
Predictably, this dependence on written evidence features
prominently in KaradfiC's recently launched appeal. 247 It has
also been part of his legal adviser's public commentary on the
trial, which unabashedly questions the legitimacy of one of the
ICTY's most important prosecutions by highlighting the Tribu-
nal's pre-trial decision "that Karad2i would not be allowed to
question 148 prosecution witnesses whose statements or prior
testimony were admitted into evidence against him." 248
It follows that this extensive use of written evidence has
the tendency to negatively affect not only the fair trial rights of
the accused and the perceived fairness of the proceedings but
also the "symbolic significance" of international criminal pros-
ecutions.2 49 This is particularly true because a vast amount of
associated exhibits, "unseen by the general public," tend to be
introduced in conjunction with the statements, a process that
"negatively impacts on the public character of the trial"2 5 0 and
consequently hinders the public's access to evidence. 2 5 1 In
fact, the public is left unaware of the substance of both these
Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2009) (providing that the parties may submit amalga-
mated 92 ter statements and that the presenting party may conduct either a
limited examination-in-chief for the purposes of "clarifying or highlighting
particular aspects of the witness's evidence" or a broader examination-in-
chief of "partial" 92 ter witnesses-witnesses whose evidence was submitted
partly in writing and partly elicited orally through direct examination).
246. Prosecutor v. Karad2ii, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Public Redacted Ver-
dict ofJudgment on 24 March 2016, ¶ 6137 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016).
247. Prosecutor v. Karadi, Case No. MICT-13-55-A, Radovan Karadiit's
Notice of Appeal, 1 2 (Mechanism for Int'l Crim. Tribs. July 22, 2016) (as-
serting that "admitting untested written evidence of huge swaths of the pros-
ecution's case before the trial even began" violated the presumption of inno-
cence and gave rise to four separate grounds of appeal).
248. Peter Robinson, The Karadid Case: Fair Tial or Show Trial?, E-INr'L
REL. (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/01/the-Karad2id-case-
fair-trial-or-show-trial (noting that, before the first witness was called, a
mountain of evidence had already been admitted against the accused).
249. Mark Findlay, Synthesis in Trial Procedures? The Experience of Interna-
tional Criminal TDibunals, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 26, 52 (2001) (averring that
international criminal trials ought to be as public as possible and a process
in which "the interest of the observer should be retained").
250. Fergal Gaynor et al., Admissibility of Documentary Evidence, in INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: RULES AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 35, at 1044,
1057.
251. Rohan, supra note 161, at 301-02.
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associated exhibits and the contents of the admitted state-
ment, "which is the witness's case in chief-[because this] is
never revealed in open court." 252 These factors, in turn, create
a noticeable conflict between the ICTY Prosecution's evident
interest in increasing the amount of written testimony intro-
duced at trial253 and its acknowledgment that "the production
of large quantities of written evidence can render trials sterile,
reduce the impact of prosecution evidence, and may make the
criminal process very difficult for the public to follow." 2 5 4 In
addition, the greater the amount of written evidence, the
greater the likelihood that its use will "preclude the trans-
parency needed in order to engage interested communi-
ties,"255 thereby undermining the institution's "reconciliatory
function." 256
B. ICC Parallels
By comparison, one might be tempted to conclude that
the ICC is unlikely to face similar problems in its combined
use of 68(2) (b) and 68(3) primarily because of the Court's
avowed statutory preference for in-person testimony.257 How-
ever, recent developments at the ICC suggest otherwise. De-
252. Id. at 296-97 (noting that the offering party simply reads a summary
of the statement into the record).
253. Wald, supra note 12, at 541 ("The Prosecutor has stated on several
occasions, her belief that, for expedition's sake, more evidence should be
introduced in the civil-Continental form, as opposed to live witnesses.").
254. U.N. Secretary-General, Comments on the Report of the Expert Group to
Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and Functioning of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, ¶ 54, U.N. Doc. A/54/850 (Apr. 27, 2000) (noting further that writ-
ten evidence may undermine the credibility of the tribunals in the eyes of
victims and the international community).
255. Jackson, supra note 64, at 22.
256. Sluiter, supra note 46, at 233.
257. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 69(2) ("The testimony of a witness at
trial shall be given in person, except to the extent provided by the measures
set forth in Article 68 or in the RPE.") (emphasis added). "This sentence
makes in-court personal testimony the rule, giving effect to the principle of
orality." Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-1386 OA5 OA6,
Judgment on the Appeals of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Combo and the Prose-
cutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber III Entitled "Decision on the
Admission into Evidence of Materials Contained in the Prosecution's List of
Evidence," 1 76 (May 3, 2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/
CR2011 05528.PDF.
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spite early optimism that the Court would be immune from
the efficiency pressures placed on the ICTY due to the Tribu-
nal's temporary status,258 the ICC's permanency has not
shielded it from this type of external compulsion. Instead, just
as the Tribunal was made to answer for its slow progress to the
entity that created and financed its operation, the same has
been the case at the ICC since at least 2010. That year, the
ICC's Assembly of States Parties (ASP) adopted a resolution
that expressly identified improving "the efficiency and effec-
tiveness" of the Court as "a common interest" of the ASP and
the ICC.259 This started a process that resulted in revised Rule
68, a provision adopted on the recommendation of a group of
ICC judges, 260 in consultation with major stakeholders, to "re-
duce the length of Court proceedings and streamline evidence
presentation." 2 6 1
Accordingly, Trial Chambers have begun to move towards
using the rule for its avowed purpose. For example, the Nta-
258. See Caianiello, supra note 45, at 408 (contending that the pressures
placed on the Tribunal, intimately tied to the goal of bringing the institution
to a close, "should not have any implications for the ICC, which is not sub-
ject to any completion strategy").
259. Int'l Criminal Court [ICC], Resolution ICC-ASP/9/Res.2: Establish-
ment of a Study Group on Governance, ICC-ASP/9/20 (Dec. 10, 2010).
260. The proposal came from the Working Group on Lessons Learnt, a
group created in 2012 to determine the necessary amendments to the ICC's
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. All interested judges could contribute to
the group. Int'l Criminal Court [ICC], Study Group on Governance: Lessons
Learnt: First Rep. of the Court to the Assembly of States Parties, ICC-ASP/11/31/
Add.1, 1 13 (Oct. 23, 2012), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp-docs/
ASP11/ICC-ASP-11-31-Addl-ENG.pdf [hereinafter Study Group on Govern-
ance, First Rep.]
261. Int'l Criminal Court [ICC], Report on the Working Group on Amend-
ments, ICC-ASP/12/44, 1 8 (Oct. 24, 2013), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
asp-docs/ASP12/ICC-ASP-12-44-ENG.pdf. But see YVONNE McDERMOTF, FAI-
NESS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALs 90-91 (2016) (maintaining that the
"efficiency argument" does not stand up to scrutiny, in part because the
length of the Court's first prosecution, which lasted over eight years, was not
attributable to in-court testimony). In fact, fewer than seventy witnesses were
called in the Lubanga trial. H:kan Friman, Trial Procedures-With a Particular
Focus on the Relationship Between the Proceedings of the Pre-Trial and Trial Cham-
bers, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 909,
910 (Carsten Stahn ed., 2015). At the same time, however, Friman notes that
the Prosecutor's revised policies, announced prior to the amendments, "may
result in more witnesses and greater reliance on 'live testimony,' which
could extend the length of proceedings." Id. at 913.
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ganda Chamber recently directed the prosecution to "consider
the use of Rule 68(2) (b) in appropriate cases and increase the
use of Rule 68(3)" to expedite trial proceedings,262 a demand
that prompted the prosecution to add more than a dozen wit-
nesses under the provision in addition to those whose testi-
mony it had already submitted in paper form.2 63 The Gbagbo
Chamber also appears to have recently embraced the rule's
efficiency potential. First, in a manner reminiscent of the
changes noted in the Tribunal's Annual Reports,264 the Cham-
ber went from highlighting the importance of live witness testi-
mony and full respect for the rights of the accused to silence
on both topics. Specifically, in September 2015, the Chamber's
Directions on the Conduct of Proceedings expressly noted
"the primacy of orality and the right of the accused to examine
or have examined the witnesses against him."2 65 Yet, just eight
months later, the Chamber issued a revised set of directions
that makes no reference to the principle of orality, nor to the
right of the accused to confront his accusers. Instead, the re-
vised directions note simply that "the parties may make use of
prior recorded testimonies with a view to maximizing the effi-
ciency of the time spent in the courtroom."266 This marked an
apparent turning point in the case, opening the door to a de-
velopment that demonstrates the limited effect of the Court's
ostensible preference for in person testimony, despite its
noted virtues in ICC appellate jurisprudence. 267
262. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Supplemental
Decision on Matters Related to the Conduct of Proceedings, 1 15, (May 27,
2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_03798.PDF.
263. See Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Prosecution's
Revised Time Estimates for the List of Witnesses (July 29, 2016), https://
www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_.05470.PDF.
264. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
265. Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/15, Directions on the
Conduct of the Proceedings, 1 54 (Sept. 3 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/
CourtRecords/CR2015-15523.PDF. The remaining two paragraphs under
the heading of recorded testimony discuss only the designated time require-
ments for Rule 68 filings. Id. ¶¶ 55, 56.
266. Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/15, Decision Adopting
Amended and Supplemented Directions on the Conduct of the Proceed-
ings, Annex A, ¶ 48 (May 4, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/
CR2016_03214.PDF.
267. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-1386 OA5
OA6, Judgment on the Appeals of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and the
Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber III Entitled "Decision on
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By mid-2016, the prosecution announced its plan to
tender at least seventy-eight further applications pursuant to
revised Rule 68 in the Gbagbo trial, meaning "that well over half
of the prosecution witnesses in [the] case would never provide
their evidence orally."268 Gbagbo objected and contrasted this
fact with the Court's unmodified, statutory preference for live tes-
timony.269 Despite acknowledging these arguments, however,
the ICC Appeals Chamber did not effectively engage with
them. Instead, its November 2016 decision simply maintained
that "respect for the principle of orality cannot be reduced to
a purely mathematical calculation of the percentage of wit-
nesses providing their entire evidence orally." 270 In other
words, even when the majority of witness testimony is in the
form of out-of-court statements, an ICC trial may nevertheless
comply with a statutory provision that "makes in-court per-
the Admission into Evidence of Materials Contained in the Prosecution's
List of Evidence," 1 76 (May 3, 2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Cour-
tRecords/CR201 L05528.PDF ("The importance of in-court personal testi-
mony is that the witness giving evidence under oath does so under the obser-
vation and general oversight of the Chamber. The Chamber hears the evi-
dence directly from the witness and is able to observe his or her demeanour
and composure, and is also able to seek clarification on aspects of the wit-
ness' testimony that may be unclear so that it may be accurately recorded.").
268. Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/15, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Application to Introduce Prior Recorded Testimony Under
Rules 68(2) (b) and 68(3), Annex Red, Partially Dissenting Opinion ofJudge
Henderson, ¶ 3 (June 13, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/
CR2016 04267.PDF.
269. Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/15, Document in Sup-
port of the Appeal Against the "Decision on the Prosecutor's Application to
Introduce Prior Recorded Testimony Under Rules 68(2) (b) and 68(3)," ¶t
9-11 (July 21, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/
CR2016 05426.PDF.
270. Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/15 OA 8, Judgment
on the Appeals of Mr. Laurent Gbagbo and Mr. Charles B16 Goud6 Against
the Decision of Trial Chamber I of 9 June 2016 Entitled "Decision on the
Prosecutor's Application to Introduce Prior Recorded Testimony Under
Rules 68(2)(b) and 68(3)," 1 78 (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/
CourtRecords/CR2016_24756.PDF. The Trial Chamber has since empha-
sized the need to expedite the proceedings, emphasizing that the then-pre-
dicted use of live witness testimony was unsustainable. Prosecutor v. Gbagbo,
Case No. ICC-02/11-01/15, Order Requesting the Parties and Participants to
Submit Information for the Purposes of the Conduct of the Proceedings
Pursuant to Article 64(2) of the Statute and Rule 140 of the Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/
CR201700317.PDF.
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sonal testimony the rule."2 7 ' Admittedly, this approach might
make sense under the right set of facts-if, for example, writ-
ten statements (though numerous) are extremely limited in
content, while the testimony of fewer, well-placed witnesses de-
livers most of the evidence against the accused. Yet, this more
nuanced approach muddies the waters regarding what statu-
tory compliance requires, resulting in an ambiguity that is un-
likely to play out in the accused's favor. Indeed, the Appeals
Chamber's pronouncement may ultimately mean that the
Court's in-principle preference for live testimony is im-
perceptible in practice and, perhaps, indiscernible from that
of the ICTY.
VII. ICTY RuL 92 QUATER/ICC RuL 68(2) (c)
A. The History Behind 92 quater's "Reliability" Requirement
In 2006, the ICTY adopted Rule 92 quater,272 which ad-
dresses the admissibility of written statements made by unavail-
able persons (individuals now deceased, untraceable, or too
impaired to testify in court).273 The provision was later im-
ported (almost verbatim) into the ICC RPE as Rule
68(2) (c),274 although 92 quater's history raises legitimate ques-
tions about this decision. Prior to the rule's adoption at the
ICTY, written statements of unavailable witnesses were ad-
271. Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-1386 OA5 OA6,
Judgment on the Appeals of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and the Prose-
cutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber III Entitled "Decision on the
Admission into Evidence of Materials Contained in the Prosecution's List of
Evidence," 1 76 (May 3, 2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/
CR2011_05528.PDF. See also supra note 257 and accompanying text.
272. Like the amendments noted above, the rule resulted from a rights-
protective case that prohibited the admission of a written statement by a
deceased witness that went to the acts and conduct of the accused. See Mc-
Dermott, supra note 103, at 972-73. Ostensibly the rule was adopted to "save
court time and expense." OIOS 2008 Audit, supra note 187, 1 45.
273. ICTY RPE, Rule 92 quater (B), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 39 (Sept. 26,
2006).
274. The only significant difference in the ICC Rule is that it requires
Trial Chambers to consider whether the prosecution should have antici-
pated the witness's unavailability, such that it should have availed of the Stat-
ute's "unique investigative opportunity" option. ICC RPE, Rule 68(c)(i),
ICC-PIDS-LT-02-002/13-Eng (2013). This statutory provision allows for evi-
dence taking with defense representation. See Rome Statute, supra note 3,
art. 56(1), (2)(d).
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dressed under 92 bis (C) and, as such, the statements could
only be admitted if their content did not address the acts and
conduct of the accused. 275 At the same time, statements of un-
available witnesses under 92 bis enjoyed a special status as com-
pared to those of available persons under the same rule. While
the latter had to meet specific technical requirements, includ-
ing a witnessed affirmation of truth under penalty of per-
jury,276 all that was required for admissibility in the case of un-
available witnesses-as remains true under Rule 92 quater and,
now, ICC Rule68 (2) (c))-was a finding of "reliability."2 7 7
Shortly after 92 bis was adopted, this reliability require-
ment was criticized, not for being too lenient but for creating
an unnecessary impediment to admission. According to Judge
May, conditioning the admissibility of untested statements of
unavailable witnesses on the basis of reliability is problematic,
primarily because subsequently admitted evidence may estab-
lish that the excluded statements were actually trustworthy.278
Under this view, the statements should be admitted and, if in-
sufficiently bolstered throughout the trial, disregarded by the
judges when formulating their judgment.279 The fairness of
this approach, then, depends upon the judges' ability to "'un-
275. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Naletilic, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Request for a Public Version of Trial Chamber's "Decision on
the Motion to Admit the Statements of Deceased Witnesses [. . .]" of 22
January 2002," Annex A (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27,
2002) (maintaining that a "teleological interpretation of Rule 92 bis requires
Rule 92 bis (C) to be read in the light of the material restriction laid down in
Rule 92 bis (A)").
276. ICTY RPE, Rule 92 bis (B), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 39 (Sept. 26, 2006)
(requiring that the witness acknowledge that she could be prosecuted for
providing false testimony).
277. ICTY RPE, Rule 92 bis (C) (ii), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 38 (June 13,
2006) (requiring only that the Chamber "finds from the circumstances in
which the statement was made and recorded that there are satisfactory indi-
cia of reliability"). The ICC rule drops the language addressing how the
statement was taken and uses the phrase "sufficient indicia of reliability."
ICC RPE, Rule 68(2)(c)(i), ICC-PIDS-LT-02-002/13_Eng (2013).
278. MAY & WIERDA, supra note 116, at 226-27.
279. Id. at 227 (concluding that excluding evidence at the admissibility
stage is "contrary to the presumption that professional judges are able to
exclude unreliable evidence from the minds when formulating their judg-
ment").
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bite' the apple of knowledge."2 o8 Moreover, even assuming
professional judges possess this cognitive super power,28 ' re-
moving the indicia of reliability requirement would arguably
have been inefficient. First, it would have invited the parties to
tender an unlimited number of unreliable, untested, and pos-
sibly untestable statements whenever the statements placed the
best gloss on the evidence for their side. In turn-and in par-
ticular when the non-moving party is the defense-failing to
counter the statements would be a risky manoeuver. In effect,
if an accused is unsure of whether admitted statements will fac-
tor into the final analysis, the prudent course of action is to
respond to all such admitted statements-even those lacking
in apparent value-as failing to do so could ultimately place
the accused in peril.2 8 2
In addition, requiring some element of reliability before
admitting the written statement of an unavailable witness was
consistent with the Tribunal's unique approach to this type of
party-generated evidence. Under 92 bis, the written statements
of available witnesses are admissible only after meeting a host
of technical requirements, including that the statement be wit-
nessed, 28 3 SWOrn, 284 and provided under penalty of perjury. 285
280. Mirjan R. Damaska, Free Proof and Its Detractors, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 343,
352 (1995) (contending that it is difficult "for any person-lay or profes-
sional-to 'unbite' the apple of knowledge").
281. See AndrewJ. Wistrich et al., CanJudges Ignore Inadmissible Information?
The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1251, 1330-31.
Wistrich et al. conclude, after a series of experiments, that judges generally
lack the capacity to ignore relevant, inadmissible evidence. See also Stephan
Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially
Biasing Information on Judges and jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. ScI. & L.
113, 125 (1994) (reporting on a study in which the decision-making of
judges and jurors alike was affected by previously excluded evidence, al-
though the judges seemed unaware of their biases).
282. In fact, there is striking international precedent for this, although it
has been rightly criticized as potentially "imposing a positive burden on ac-
cused persons to counter the evidence against them." McDermott, supra
note 103, at 984 (discussing an ICTY case in which the Trial Chamber ap-
pears to have given added weight to a 92 bis statement because the defense
did not attempt to rebut it).
283. The statement must be accompanied by a declaration witnessed by "a
person authorised to witness such a declaration in accordance with the
law and procedure of a State" or by a "Presiding Officer appointed by the
Registrar of the Tribunal for that purpose." ICTY RPE, Rule 92 bis
(B) (i) (a)-(b), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.50 (July 8, 2015).
284. Id. Rule 92 bis (B) (ii) (b).
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Rather clearly, these technical requirements governing the ad-
mission of statements from available witnesses are designed to
enhance the accuracy and, consequently, the reliability of this
"very special type of hearsay."286 Accordingly, it made sense to
condition the admission of statements from unavailable wit-
nesses on some type of assurance as to their reliability, particu-
larly given the informal and confusing manner in which such
statements are often taken, 28 7 as well as the witnesses' com-
plete unavailability for cross-examination. Indeed, these fac-
tors suggest that the threshold for admissibility ought to be at
least as rigorous, if not greater, when a party proffers a docu-
ment it created from its interview of a now unavailable witness.
Nevertheless, the rule adopted and retained this (much) less
rigorous standard for almost six years, until it was moved into
(then-new) Rule 92 quater288
285. Id. Rule 92 bis (B) (ii) (c).
286. Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocu-
tory Appeal Concerning Rule 92 bis (C), 1 30 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the For-
mer Yugoslavia June 7, 2002).
287. For example, the Naletilic Chamber noted its "various concerns with
regard to the general reliability of witness statements given to investigators of
the Prosecution ... namely the fact that such statements are not given under
oath, that they never have been subject to cross-examination, that they are
given by a witness not contemporaneously with the events in question but
only some years afterwards, and, that, in particular, the taking of these state-
ments regularly involves the process of multiple translations whose reliability
as such already appears to be at least questionable." Prosecutor v. Naletilic,
Case No. IT-98-34-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's Request for a Public Ver-
sion of Trial Chamber's "Decision on the Motion to Admit the Statements of
Deceased Witnesses [. . .]" of 22 January 2002," Annex A (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27, 2002). By contrast, as the Appeals Cham-
ber noted in the Kordic case, a statement "made under formal circumstances
... might increase its reliability." Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-
AR73.5, Decision on Appeal Regarding Statement of a Deceased Witness, 1
27 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000).
288. ICTY RPE, Rule 92 quater (A) (i)-(ii), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.50 (July
8, 2015). This rule essentially replicates, with minor stylistic refinements, for-
mer Rule 92 bis (C) (i) and (ii). For example, while 92 bis (C) (ii) required
the Chamber to "find from the circumstances in which the statement was
made and recorded that there are satisfactory indicia of its reliability," ICTY
RPE, Rule 92 bis (C) (iii), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 39 (Sept. 26, 2006), Rule 92
quater rephrases this to require that the Chamber "find[ ] from the circum-
stances in which the statement was made and recorded that it is reliable."
ICTY RPE, Rule 92 quater (A) (ii), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.50 (July 8, 2015).
The new rule likewise refines the language describing unavailability and the
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The decision to transfer this more relaxed standard into
the new rule becomes even more remarkable when one con-
siders that, unlike 92 bis, 92 quater expressly permits the admis-
sion of statements that address the acts and conduct of the
accused as charged in the indictment.289 Critically, this aspect
of 92 quater lies in significant tension with the Tribunal's ear-
lier worries about the reliability of party-generated witness
statements that notably curbed the reach of 92 bis. 290 By con-
trast, 92 quater essentially ignores this concern, even though it
arguably ought to apply with even greater force to statements
that cannot be tested by cross-examination. 29 1 Moreover, the
Tribunal's piecemeal approach to rule adoption and amend-
ment resulted in an even further lopsided and illogical state of
affairs within its revised set of rules that, inexplicably, was later
imported into the ICC framework.292 At the ICTY (and now at
the ICC) written statements of available witnesses that do not
go to the acts and conduct of the accused are subjected to
more onerous admissibility requirements, while a much less
exacting hurdle of "reliability"293 applies to statements of un-
Chamber's finding thereof, but keeps the common meaning of the provi-
sions wholly intact. Id.
289. ICTY RPE, Rule 92 ter (B), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.50 (July 8, 2015).
290. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
291. The sub-rule implicitly acknowledges that admitting written evidence
that goes to proof of acts and conduct of an accused as charged in the indict-
ment can be problematic by making this characteristic a factor that may go
against the admission of such evidence. ICTY RPE, Rule 92 quarter (B), U.N.
Doc. IT/32/Rev.50 (July 8, 2015). There is, however, no official, substantive
discussion about 92 quater, not even in the annual report issued immediately
after its adoption. Fourteenth Ann. ICTY Report, supra note 182, 1 29 (not-
ing only the addition of the rule by name).
292. See ICC RPE, Rule 68(2)(b), ICC-PIDS-LT-02-002/13_Eng (2013)
(replicating the acts and conduct limitation from 92 bis); ICC RPE, Rule
68(2) (b) (ii)-(iii), ICC-PIDS-LT-02-002/13_Eng (2013) (requiring that testi-
mony submitted pursuant to Rule 68(2) (b) be sworn and comply with addi-
tional technical requirements, including that the author was advised of per-
jury liability); ICC RPE, Rule 68(2) (c), ICC-PIDS-LT-02-002/13-Eng (2013)
(providing that an unsworn statement from an unavailable witness may be
admitted if sufficiently reliable and that the statement may go to the acts and
conduct charged, although this may be a factor against admission).
293. Gosnell, supra note 89, at 398 ("In practice, a signed witness state-
ment elicited by a party, even without attestation before a judicial officer,
will generally suffice.").
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available witnesses that may address the substance of the prose-
cution's charges. 294
B. Rule 92 quater, as applied
In the main, ICTY Trial Chambers appear to have been
cautious in their admission of 92 quater evidence, particularly
when the proposed statements address the acts and conduct of
the accused. In at least three instances, two separate chambers
rejected the prosecution's attempt to admit such statements
under the rule because admission without the opportunity for
cross-examination would have "constitute [d] an unfair
prejudice. 295 Moreover, in the limited instances in which 92
quater statements that directly implicated the accused were ad-
mitted, the associated decisions appeared to require some-
thing more than the rule's "indicia of reliability" threshold. 296
Specifically, Trial Chambers sought additional "guarantees of
reliability" before exercising the discretion to admit this type
of Rule 92 quater evidence, such as the cumulative nature of
the statements, corroboration from other witnesses, and the
defense's ability to cross-examine other prosecution witnesses
who provided similar evidence.297 Indeed, even when pro-
294. Rohan, supra note 161, at 299 (describing the disparity as "ironic").
295. Prosecutor v. Karad2i4, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Prosecu-
tion's Motion for Admission of the Evidence of Milenko Lazic Pursuant to
Rule 92 Quarter and for Leave to Add Exhibits to Rule 65 Ter Exhibit List, 1
22, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 9, 2012); Prosecutor v.
Karad2i6, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Ad-
mission of the Evidence of KDZ172 (Milan Babic) Pursuant to Rule 92
Quater, 11 41-42 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 13, 2010);
Prosecutor v. Safelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Redacted Version of the "Decision on
the Prosecution's Consolidated Motion Pursuant to Rules 89 (F), 92 Bis, 92
Ter and 92 Quarter of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence" Filed Confiden-
tially on 7 January 2008, ¶1 41-42 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugosla-
via Feb. 21, 2008) (rejecting, in the "interests of justice," the written testi-
mony of deceased witnesses whose statements directly allege responsibility of
the accused who would be denied the right of cross-examination).
296. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Decision on
Second Prosecution Motion for Admission of Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92
Quater, ¶ 7 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 5, 2007) (con-
cluding that there was a satisfactory indicia of reliability regarding a prior
statement because the witness later affirmed it was true).
297. See, e.g., id. at 1 9 (describing the 92 quater statement as relating to
and "generally consistent with" the evidence of two live witnesses whom the
defense cross-examined). See also Prosecutor v. Popovic, Case No. IT-05-88-T,
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posed Rule 92 quater statements did not address the acts and
conduct of the accused, whether the statement was corrobora-
tive in nature generally played an important role in determin-
ing if admission would prejudice the accused. 298
Nevertheless, and consistent with the analysis above, most
academic commentary on the rule is suitably critical, as Rule
92 quater's ability to implicate fair trial concerns has the mak-
ings of a perfect storm. Subject to an undemanding reliability
requirement, the rule permits the introduction of party-gener-
ated witness statements that go directly to establishing the
charges against the accused, despite a longstanding (and rea-
sonable) suspicion of this type of evidence in adversarial pro-
ceedings,299 and all without the benefit of cross-examination.
As a result, 92 quater "risks leading a trial chamber to draw
impermissibly incriminating conclusions upon evidence that is
not sufficiently reliable for that purpose,"300 thereby posing a
serious threat to the institution's normative and sociological
legitimacy.
C. Relevant ICC Practice
Thus far, the Court's case law includes at least one ruling
that replicates the Tribunal's emphasis on corroboration in its
68(2) (c) assessment.301 However, a separate decision in the
Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Evidence Pursuant to Rule
92 Quater, 1J 45, 48, 57, 64 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr.
21, 2008) (considering the cumulative nature of the evidence, the corrobo-
ration of other witnesses, and the fact that, in each case, the testimony was
elicited during prior judicial proceedings).
298. See e.g., Prosecutor v. Mladic, Case No. IT-09-92-T, Decision of Prose-
cution Rule 92 Quater Motion (Witness RM-012), 1 11 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 13, 2013) (determining that the accused was not
prejudiced by the lack of cross-examination with respect to a statement ad-
mitted pursuant to 92 quater because the statement was cumulative and did
not go to the acts and conduct charged in the indictment).
299. Jackson, supra note 64, at 33 ("Strict rules such as regarding hearsay
in an adversarial setting reflect suspicions about the way in which evidence is
gathered and collected by the parties. Relaxing the standards for admissibil-
ity of such evidence without the possibility of a full and effective examination
of the original source runs the risk of error.").
300. Gosnell, supra note 89, at 420.
301. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, Decision
on "Prosecution Submission of Evidence Pursuant to Rule 68(2) (c) of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence," 1 22 (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR201700929.PDF (exercising its discretion to ad-
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Ntaganda case applied the provision quite differently. In that
matter, the Prosecution used Rule 68(2) (c) to introduce the
out-of-court statements and transcripts of three (then-de-
ceased) witnesses and more than sixty associated exhibits.30 2
Contrary to comparable ICTY case law, however, the Ntaganda
Chamber's admissibility assessment included no consideration
of whether the proposed written testimony was cumulative,
corroborated by other evidence, or capable of being tested in
other ways
In fact, the decision omits any reference to these promi-
nent ICTY safeguards. It likewise neglects to consider how the
statements' admission might impact the fairness of the trial,
even though the written testimony of one of the witnesses per-
tained directly-and quite damningly-to the charges against
Ntaganda.303 Instead, the decision merely states that because
of its reliability 304-noted as an undemanding prerequisite to
admission multiple times over-"the Chamber considers that
the testimony's prima facie probative value outweighs any preju-
dicial effect caused to the accused by its introduction."3 0 5 Ac-
cordingly, the evidence was admitted without any discernible
consideration of its effect on the fairness of the trial,306 nor
any mention of the negative impact that the absence of cross-
examination might have upon the proceedings.
D. International Human Rights Law and Efficiency
In addition to the fair trial concerns created by 92 quater!
68(2) (c), the fact that cross-examination is impossible runs the
mit a Rule 68(2) (c) statement introduced "solely to corroborate" other pros-
ecution evidence).
302. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision on
Prosecution Application Under Rule 68 (2) (c) of the Rules for Admission of
Prior Recorded Testimony of P-0022, P-0041 and P-0103 (Nov. 20, 2015),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_22692.PDF.
303. The proposed written evidence included allegations of Ntaganda's
personal "involvement in the training of child soldiers in Mandro, the mur-
der of a priest in Mongwalu and acts of pillaging." Id. ¶ 37.
304. Id. ¶ 32. This conclusion was based on the fact that the witness's out
of court statement was "internally coherent and consistent with [the wit-
ness's] in-court testimony [in a separate case]," was signed by the witness
and indicated that it was voluntarily given).
305. Id. 1 27.
306. The Trial Chamber acknowledged this statutory responsibility at the
outset of the opinion, but made no subsequent reference to it. Id. 1 6.
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risk of (ironically) undermining the efficiency of trial proceed-
ings. For example, at the ICTY, convictions could not be
"based solely, or in a decisive manner" on evidence that had
not been subjected to cross-examination.3 0 7 This standard,
based on then-existing international human rights law ren-
dered the utility of unexamined, directly incriminating written
evidence entirely dependent upon corroborating, indepen-
dent evidence.308 Nevertheless, the existence of the latter at
the ICTY was not a prerequisite to the admission of the for-
mer.309 Consequently, nothing prevented the admission of
uncorroborated, unexamined, directly incriminating written
statements although, by definition, these submissions were
simply not useful.3 10 Moreover, the introduction of such evi-
dence was also arguably inefficient in cases where it was sup-
ported by independent, corroborating evidence. Pursuant to
the "sole or decisive" limitation on unexamined evidence, the
independent, properly tested evidence must be capable of sup-
porting a conviction on its own,311 a fact that seemingly ren-
ders related, untested written evidence superfluous. By con-
trast, if the untested written evidence is needed to support the
independent, tested evidence, this would render it decisive
307. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Prlic, Case No. IT-04-74-AR73.6, Decision on
Appeals Against Decision Admitting Transcript ofJadranko Prlic's Question-
ing into Evidence, 1 53 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 23,
2007) (noting Tribunal compliance with then existing ECtHR case-law).
308. Gosnell, supra note 89, at 419.
309. Id. at 420. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Popovic, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Deci-
sion on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92
Quater, ¶¶ 62-63 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 21, 2008)
(maintaining that corroboration is "simply a factor to take into considera-
tion" when applying 92 quarter and deciding to admit a directly incriminat-
ing, unexamined, and partly uncorroborated statement pursuant to the
rule).
310. Adding to this inefficiency, 92 quater statements may be accompanied
by associated documents and exhibits. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case
No. IT-06-90-T, Decision on the Admission of Statements of Two Witnesses
and Associated Documents Pursuant to Rule 92 Quater (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 16, 2009).
311. Gosnell, supra note 89, at 420 ("If the corroborated information is
strong enough to ensure that the statement is not given 'decisive' weight,
then it must logically also be weighty enough to sustain a conviction on its
own.").
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and, if so used, "the uncross-examined statement would be ac-
corded more weight than it can be given."3 12
Whether this latter efficiency problem will extend to the
ICC will depend upon whether the Court adopts the stricter
"sole or decisive" test employed at the ICTY or the more flexi-
ble approach recently announced by the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR). According to the latter, a trial may be
deemed fair even when untested evidence is decisive-that is,
"of such significance or importance as to be likely to deter-
mine the outcome of the case" 3 1 3-so long as there are "suffi-
cient counterbalancing factors,"3 14 such as corroboration.3 15
Questions regarding the effect of such an approach on the
Court's sociological legitimacy aside,316 it would appear to be
normatively legitimate for the Court to adopt this rule.31 7 Even
if the Court applied this more flexible test, however, the first
noted efficiency problem remains: unless the necessary "coun-
terbalancing factors" are made a prerequisite to admission,
unexamined written statements (and their associated exhibits)
submitted pursuant to 68(2) (c)-however voluminous and
time-consuming to consider-may ultimately prove useless.
312. Id.
313. Horncastle v. United Kingdom, 2014-IV 1394 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1331,
1333 (citing Al-Khawaja v. United Kingdom, 54 Eur. Ct. H.R. 23 (2012)).
314. Id. at 1332 (maintaining that these can "compensate for any difficul-
ties caused to the defence by the admission of the statement").
315. Id. at 1361 (concluding that an untested, presumed decisive state-
ment was consistent with the right of the accused to a fair trial and to ex-
amine the witnesses against him because of "the strength of the other prose-
cution evidence in the case").
316. ICC convictions based decisively on untested, party-generated written
statements could hardly do other than cause the institution reputational
harm. See, e.g., Al-Khawaja v. United Kingdom, 54 Eur. Ct. H.R. 23, 1 61, 70
(2012) (Saj6,J., and KarakasJ., partly dissenting and partly concurring) (ex-
pressing doubt over the modification of the sole or decisive test and con-
tending that, even when counterbalancing measures are in place to protect
the right to a fair trial, "it will remain a questionable achievement, as it
comes at the price of sacrificing an expressly granted Convention right").
317. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 21(3) (requiring compliance with
internationally recognized human rights law). Nevertheless, it is possible to
argue that this approach violates the accused's right to "to examine, or have
examined, the witnesses against him or her," as this statutory provision in-
cludes no limiting language. Id. art. 67(1) (e).
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E. Summary
Without doubt, the most remarkable aspect of 92 quater is
that the rule permits the admission of written witness state-
ments that directly implicate the accused in the crimes
charged without the test of cross-examination. This change
marked an unexplained about-face from the Tribunal's earlier
expressed concerns about the reliability of such party-gener-
ated evidence and its consequent effect on a fair trial. At the
same time, the Tribunal's use of 92 quater might be described
as cautious. Its decisions explicitly recognize the importance of
alternate guarantees of reliability, such as corroboration, even
for proposed statements that do not directly implicate the ac-
cused. As for statements that address the acts and conduct
charged, relevant jurisprudence unfailingly acknowledges
their potential for prejudice and includes multiple instances of
exclusion. Indeed, the Tribunal's admission of 92 quater state-
ments directly implicating the accused appears consistently de-
pendent upon alternate guarantees, such as corroboration and
the ability to test the statements' content through the exami-
nation of other witnesses. 1
Whether the ICC will follow the Tribunal's lead in this
respect remains unclear, as early case law is limited, mixed,
and non-binding.3 19 While at least one Trial Chamber decision
emphasizes the importance of corroboration to 68(2) (c) de-
terminations, at least one other evidences decidedly less con-
cern (if any) regarding the use of the rule and its effect on the
Court's obligation to provide a fair trial.3 20 In fact, the latter
318. For examples of such cases, see supra notes 296-97 and accompany-
ing text.
319. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 21(2) ("The Court may apply princi-
ples and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions.") (emphasis
added). Despite this seemingly broad language, Schabas convincingly argues
that the ratio decidendi of Appeals Chamber decisions should be followed by
the Trial and Pre Trial Chambers and that, in practice, this has thus far been
the case. WILLIAM A. ScHABAs, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COM-
MENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 395-96 (2010).
320. Compare Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, Decision
on "Prosecution Submission of Evidence Pursuant to Rule 68(2) (c) of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence," 1 22 (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017 00929.PDF (exercising its discretion to ad-
mit a 68(2) (c) statement introduced "solely to corroborate" other prosecu-
tion evidence) with Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, De-
cision on Prosecution Application Under Rule 68 (2) (c) of the Rules for Ad-
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decision appears to overlook the absence of corroborating evi-
dence or other guarantees, maintaining instead that directly
incriminating, party-generated witness statements are "prima
facie" admissible upon meeting the sub-rule's relatively unde-
manding "indicia of reliability" requirement. Notably, should
future rulings embrace this approach, this will impact both
fairness and efficiency. Indeed, if the only admissibility prereq-
uisite is a low hurdle that can be met by such factors as "inter-
nal consistency" and a witness's acknowledgment when giving
her statement that it is voluntarily made,321 this will invite the
parties to follow the lead of their ICTY counterparts, clogging
ICC trials with what Murphy has excellently coined "evidential
debris."3 22 As a result, Trial Chambers will have the task of
twice vetting a vast number of 68(2) (c) statements (and their
"associated exhibits") 323 only to afford little or no weight to
the material in the final analysis. This, in turn, would exacer-
bate the aforementioned efficiency problems likely to result
from the Court's compliance with international human rights
law.
VIII. RULE 92 QUINQUIES/ ICC RuLE 68(2) (D)
A. The Adoption of 92 quinquies
Virtually all the observations regarding 92 quater apply
equally to the subsequently adopted Rule 92 quinquies,324 the
last of the rules imported into the ICC's procedural framework
and the final topic of consideration.3 25 Like 92 quater, and
again at odds with the Tribunal's earlier concerns about the
reliability of party-generated evidence, 92 quinquies permits the
mission of Prior Recorded Testimony of P-0022, P-0041 and P-0103 (Nov. 20,
2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_22692.PDF (not con-
sidering whether written testimony was corroborated by other evidence).
321. See supra note 304 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nta-
ganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision on Prosecution Application
Under Rule 68(2) (c) of the Rules for Admission of Prior Recorded Testi-
mony of P-0022, P-004.1 and P-0103 (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/
CourtRecords/CR2015_22692.PDF.
322. Murphy & Baddour, supra note 199, at 369.
323. Such evidence will be read first for admission and later as evidence.
ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 188, at 345 n.135.
324. Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY], Amendments to the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/268 (Dec. 16, 2009).
325. ICC RPE, Rule 68(2) (d), ICC-PIDS-LT-02-002/13_Eng (2013).
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admission of untested statements that go directly to the acts
and conduct with which the accused is charged.3 2 6 The provi-
sion governs prior statements given by persons who fail to at-
tend trial, or who attend but fail to give evidence, due to "im-
proper interference."3 2 7 In such cases, the rule provides that
the prior statements may be considered, even without the test
of cross-examination, whenever "the interests ofjustice [would
be] best served" by their admission.328 As explained by the
ICTY's then-President Patrick Robinson, the provision was a
"procedural innovation," designed to "enable core proceed-
ings to go forward even where there are attempts to interfere
with the administration of justice."329
Therefore, 92 quinquies was not adopted with the purpose
of expediting trial proceedings per se, but rather to "offset any
potential obstacles for the expeditious progress of the
cases."330 As has been widely observed, the rule was added to
the ICTY's procedural regime in response to particular diffi-
culties the Tribunal then faced.331 Specifically, the rule was
adopted at a time when the Seself trial had been delayed for
nearly a year due to allegations of witness intimidation.3 3 2 Si-
multaneously, the Appeals Chamber was also considering the
appeal of two acquittals in the Hardinaj case that were alleg-
edly obtained under "prevailing circumstances of witness in-
326. ICTY RPE, Rule 92 quinquies (A), (B) (iii), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 50
(July 8, 2015).
327. Id. Rule 92 quinquies (A) (ii).
328. Id. Rule 92 quinquies (A) (iv). See also ICC RPE, Rule68(2) (d) (i), ICC-
PIDS-LT-02-002/13_.Eng (2013) (omitting the factors to be considered in
the interests of justice assessment).
329. Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY], Statement by judge
Patrick Robinson, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, to the Security Council on 18 june 2010, (June 18, 2010).
330. Peter Robinson, President, ICTY, Presentation at Diplomatic Seminar
(May 28, 2009) (explaining the decision to consider a provision admitting
the written statements of intimidated witnesses).
331. See, e.g., GIDEON BOAS ET AL., 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW PRAC-
TIONER LIBRARY. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 354 n.98 (2011) (opin-
ing that the new rule was "apparently motivated by difficulties in securing
witnesses in the Seself and Haradinaj cases").
332. Press Release, Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY]
(Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.icty.org/sid/10302 (noting that the trial "was
adjourned on 11 February 2009 on the request of the Prosecution amid alle-
gations of witness intimidation").
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timidation and fear."33 3 In fact, because Rule 92 quinquies was
adopted in the midst of the Haradinaj appeal, 334 there was
some speculation at the time that the new rule would be used
in the subsequent retrial.335
Instead, as was only recently revealed, the sole attempt to
utilize the sub-rule arose in the Karadfi case.33 6 In that in-
stance, however, the Trial Chamber refused to permit the evi-
dence because the case against Karad2ik was pending at the
time 92 quinquies was adopted.337 Consequently, the associated
decision provides no direct precedent to inform the Court in
its application of Rule 68(2) (d), the ICC equivalent of 92 quin-
quies.338 This might be seen as unfortunate because the new
sub-rule seems poised to play an important role at the ICC. As
some of the Court's judges recently noted, "Witness interfer-
ence is a live and ongoing issue in ICC cases, [and it] may be
333. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-A, Prosecution's Notice of
Appeal, 1 3 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 1, 2008). In the
matter, it was alleged that "[t]he Trial Chamber denied the Prosecution a
fair trial by not granting it the additional time necessary to exhaust all rea-
sonable steps to obtain the testimony of [certain recalcitrant] witnesses"). Id.
334. David Re, Appeal, in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTORS 797, 841-42 (Luc
Reydams et al. eds., 2012). See also Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-
84-A, Judgement (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 19, 2010).
335. See, e.g., Gentian Zyberi, The ICTY Appeals Judgment in the Haradinaj
Case, EJIL TALKI (Oct. 11, 2010) (contending that 92 quinquies is "surely an
amendment detrimental [to Haradinaj]" and therefore "cannot be used at
trial").
336. Prosecutor v. Karadlit, Case No. MICT-15-96-T, Decision on a Re-
quest to Provide Stanigic and Simatovic Access to a Confidential Decision on
the Karadid Case (Mechanism for Int'l Crim. Tribs. July 27, 2017).
337. Prosecutor v. Karaclie, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Prosecu-
tion Motion to Admit Prior Evidence of Milan Tupajic Pursuant to Rule 92
Quinquies, 1 15 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 2012).
ICTY Rule 6(D) provides, in relevant part, that an amendment shall "not
operate to prejudice the rights of the accused or of a convicted or acquitted
person in any pending case." ICTY RPE, Rule 6(D), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.
50 (July 8, 2015).
338. Nevertheless, dicta from the recently revealed decision could well as-
sist ICC judges in the future Rule 68(2) (d) decision-making. Prosecutor v.
Karadlie, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion to Admit
Prior Evidence of Milan Tupajic Pursuant to Rule 92 Quinquies, 11 16-18
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 2012) (emphasizing that
the witness's fears must be genuine, a result of improper interference-such
as intimidation or bribery-and the fears must have materially influenced
the decision not to testify).
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more of an issue at the ICC than the ICTY."33 9 In fact, as dis-
cussed below, when 68(2) (d) was adopted, the Court faced its
own witness intimidation problems and the prosecution later
attempted to use the provision because of them.
Before considering these developments, however, it
makes sense to briefly note the critical response to the ICTY's
initial adoption of 92 quinquies. One commentator described
the rule's addition to the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and
Evidence as "the latest and hopefully the last of the rules per-
mitting written witness statements in evidence at the expense
of the accused right to cross examination." 3 4 0 Another critic
pointed to the rule as an important example of how the Tribu-
nal was "shifting progressively (and worryingly in [his] opin-
ion) toward.the admission of any type of written evidence."3 41
Remarkably, these observations speak not just to the merit of
92 quinquies, but also to the Tribunal's overall approach to
written evidence. Moreover, they are consistent with the over-
whelming majority of scholarship on the topic, as summarized
in this blistering commentary:
These rules and amendments to the rules are an af-
front to the right of the accused to have a fair trial,
and often the decisions handed down in relation to
these rules demonstrate questionable, if not poor le-
gal reasoning. The judicial interpretation of a Rule
or a series of Rules (i.e. Rules 92 bis, 89(C) and
89(F)) resulted in the ever-expanding admission of
hearsay evidence at the expense of the statutorily
guaranteed rights of the accused.342
Accordingly, this prompts questions about the decision to rep-
licate the ICTY approach at the ICC in the first place, let alone
the choice to import the controversial 92 quinquies.
339. Study Group on Governance, Second Rep., supra note 232, 1 34. The
report explains that this is so "because of the lack of a subpoena power and
the differences in the nature of criminal investigations at each institution."
Id.
340. Rohan, supra note 161, at 302.
341. Cainaniello, supra note 45, at 407-08.
342. O'Sullivan & Montgomery, supra note 99, at 535 (assessing the use of
written statements just prior to the adoption of 92 quinquies).
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B. Fairness Concerns
Like 92 quater, 92 quinquies and its ICC equivalent, Rule
68(2) (d), require neither a specific indicia of reliability in or-
der for written witness statements to be admitted, nor that the
prior statements have been given under oath. The rules also
expressly provide that the unexamined evidence may go di-
rectly to the acts and conduct with which the accused is
charged,3 4 3 although, in a seemingly more rights-protective
fashion, the ICC rule indicates that this may be a factor against
the statement's introduction. 3 4 Neither the ICTY rule nor its
ICC equivalent place an onus on the prosecution to provide
the defense with an alternative opportunity to examine the wit-
ness in cases where it is aware in advance of the risk of non-
appearance.3 4 5 This is unfortunate, particularly because this
requirement could certainly have been incorporated into the
ICC version of the rule.3 4 6
Moreover, 68(2) (c) may be used even when the accused is
in no way connected to the witness interference that prompted
the failure to testify.347 In fact, it was expressly decided to repli-
343. ICTY RPE, Rule 92 quinquies (B) (iii), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 50 (July
8, 2015) ("Evidence admitted under paragraph (A) may include evidence
that goes to proof of the acts and conduct of the accused as charged in the
indictment.").
344. ICC RPE, Rule 68(2) (d) (iv), ICC-PIDS-LT-02-002/13_Eng (2013).
345. James F. Flanagan, We Have a "Purpose" Requirement If We Can Keep It,
13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 553, 569-570 (2009) (contending that when the
prosecution is aware that there are risks that the witness might not appear at
trial, it must respond with efforts to provide confrontation by other means").
346. To this end, one possibility in this regard is the requirement that the
prosecution avail itself of the unique investigative opportunity provision.
Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 56. In fact, the relevance of this rule to ICC
Rule 68(2) (c)-the Court's 92 quater equivalent-was expressly recognized.
See ICC RPE, Rule 68 (2) (c) (i), ICC-PIDS-LT-02-002/13_Eng (2013) (requir-
ing that the Chamber be satisfied that "the necessity of measures under arti-
cle 56 could not be anticipated). Even in the domestic realm the call for a
comparable safeguard is "a recommendation with a long pedigree." Marny
Requa, Absent Witnesses and the UK Supreme Court: Judicial Deference as Judicial
Dialogue, 14 INT'LJ. EVIDENCE & PROOF 208, 211 (2010) (noting that the UK
may need to reform its laws to allow for pretrial questioning of witnesses by
the defense "to protect confrontation rights while respecting the interests of
witnesses"); see also id. at 226-27 (considering pre-trial questioning in greater
detail).
347. ICTY RPE, Rule 92 quinquies (B) (ii) (b), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 50
(July 8, 2015) (dictating that "the apparent role of a party or someone acting
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cate this aspect of the ICTY rule at the ICC. According to the
ICC's Working Group on Lessons Learnt (WGLL) ,348 "[I]t
would be unduly restrictive to limit the applicability of this
provision only to situations where the party to the proceedings
against whom the prior recorded testimony is offered, acted
(or acted in concert with others), to improperly interfere with
the witness." 3 4 9 In part, the WGLL defends this position by
suggesting that this expansive approach will deter third parties
from engaging in acts of interference.3 5 0 This is a questionable
premise, however. If deterrence is the real goal, it would be
more logical to make use of existing tools that impose personal
liability for such conduct, both by prosecuting witness interfer-
ence as an offence against the administration of justice35 1 and
by actively publicizing related proceedings and their potential
penalties.352
Additionally, from a due process perspective, it is unjust
to saddle an accused with a trial that is less fair because of the
conduct of others, particularly when (as at the ICC) the ratio-
nale for doing so is tied directly to institutional shortcom-
on behalf of a party to the proceedings in the improper interference" should
form part of the interests of justice assessment). See also ICC RPE, Rule
68 (2) (d), ICC-PIDS-LT-02-002/13_Eng (2013).
348. The WGLL was created in 2012 to determine the necessary amend-
ments to the ICC's Rules of Procedure and Evidence; all interested judges
could contribute to the group. Study Group on Governance, First Rep., supra
note 260, 1 13.
349. Study Group on Governance, Second Report, supra note 232, at 1 34.
350. Id. See also Fergal Gaynor, Obstruction ofJustice by Silencing Witnesses:
Possible Remedies, INT'L CRIM. JUST. TODAY (Apr. 17, 2014), https://
www.international-criminaljustice-today.org/arguendo/obstruction-of-jus-
tice-by-silencing-witnesses-possible-remedies/ (contending that "[t]the new
rule at the ICC should serve to reduce the incentive for interfering with
witnesses").
351. Rome Statute, supra note 3 art.70 (1) (c).
352. The Court is authorized to impose a jail term of up to five years for
acts of witness interference. Id. art. 70(3). Although some individuals have
been charged accordingly, there has been virtually no coverage of this in the
mainstream media. See, e.g., Mayeul Hieramente, Philipp Mciller & Emma
Ferguson, Barasa, Bribery and Beyond: Offices Offences Against the Administration
ofJustice at the International Criminal Court, 14 Iwr'L CRIM. L. REv. 1123, 1124
(2014) (noting that Barasa's arrest warrant for witness interference "fade [d]
into the background"); Tom Maliti, Who Are the Witnesses in the Second Kenya
Bribery Case at the ICC-Part 1, INT'LJusT. MONITOR (Sept. 21, 2015), https:/
/www.ijmonitor.org/2015/09/who-are-the-witnesses-in-the-second-kenya-
bribery-case-at-the-icc-part-1/.
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ings.3 5 3 In fact, the adversarial doctrine of moral forfeiture-
which arose in matters involving written testimony obtained in
more neutral and formal settings354-historically required proof
that the defendant caused the witness's non-appearance
before stripping him of his right of confrontation.3 5 5 Consis-
tent with, and possibly even more rights-protective than these
ancient roots, 3 5 6 U.S. law requires "some degree of intent to
thwart the judicial process [on the part of the accused] before
thinking it reasonable to hold the confrontation right for-
feited."357 This heightened threshold is justified by the fact
that "the prosecution gains in many cases when it admits ab-
sent witness testimony."35 8 Accordingly, it highlights a short-
coming in the ICC rule, although, admittedly, not all common
law jurisdictions are as decidedly rights-protective. 359
353. See, e.g., Study Group on Governance, Second Report, supra note 232,
at 1 34 (explaining that third party interference should suffice for Rule
68(2) (d) because the ICC lacks subpoena powers and has other unique evi-
dence-gathering challenges).
354. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 357-61 (2008) (explaining that the
exception fostered the admission of testimony given at a coroner's inquest
and statements taken by justices of the peace before a magistrate).
355. Id.
356. Notably, Justice Scalia's analysis in Giles maintains that the doctrine
historically required evidence that the accused acted with the purpose of
making the witness absent. Id. But see Ellen Liang Yee, Foreiture of the Confron-
tation Right in Giles:justice Scalia's Faint-Hearted Fidelity to the Common Law, 100
J. Cium. L. & CRiM'Y 1495, 1508-12 (2010) (contending that the available
historical resources do not definitively establish this view and could equally
be interpreted to have simply required proof that the defendant caused the
witness's absence).
357. Giles, 554 U.S. at 380 (Souter, J., concurring). See also FED. R. EvID.
804(b)(6) (excluding from the rule against hearsay "statement[s] offered
against a party that wrongfully caused-or acquiesced in wrongfully caus-
ing-the declarant's unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that
result").
358. Flanagan, supra note 345, at 565. Flanagan notes further that, in such
cases, "the real witness, with all the inevitable warts, does not appear before
the jury." Id.
359. See, e.g., Requa, supra note 346, at 215 (noting that United Kingdom
jurisprudence ultimately shifted its analysis to simply asking whether the
statement's admission was consistent with a fair trial, "regardless of the rea-
son why the witness cannot be called to testify").
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1. Domestic Precedent?
This disparity amongst common law approaches to cases
of alleged witness interference leads to the question of
whether, in assessing the fairness of 68(2) (d), the provision
might find support in comparable domestic practice. To this
end, it might be pointed out that numerous common lawjuris-
dictions permit the admission of prior inconsistent statements
for their truth under certain circumstances. 3 60 However, these
examples provide incomplete analogical value due to the com-
parably challenging circumstances in which ICC witness state-
ments are likely to be obtained.3 6 1 Moreover, nearly all of
these domestic provisions are more rights protective and more
narrowly tailored than the ICC sub-rule.3 6 2
Amongst adversarial systems, it seems only the United
Kingdom has adopted legislation that, like 68(2) (d), admits
prior statements of fearful witnesses even when the witness is
completely unavailable for cross-examination and the accused
played no role in the witness's unavailability to testify.3 63 In
360. See, e.g., R. v. B. (K.G.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740 (Can.) (addressing prior
inconsistent statements of recanting witnesses available for cross-examina-
tion); Criminal Justice Act 2006 (Act No. 26/2006) (Ir.), http://
www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2006/act/26/enacted/en/pdf; FED. R. EVID.
801(d) (1) (A) (addressing prior sworn statements of declarants who testify
and are subject to cross-examination); Adam v The Queen [2001] 207 CLR 96
(Austl.) (addressing prior inconsistent statements of recanting witnesses
available for cross-examination).
361. Recently in the Gbagbo case, for example, cross-examination revealed
numerous contradictions between a witness's live testimony and his prior
recorded statements seemingly due, in part, to interpretation difficulties.
Ivoire Justice, Vague and Contradictory, the Words of Witness P-106, an Abobo
Trader, Cause a Stir in the Audience, INT'L JUST. MONITOR (Feb. 7, 2017). See
alsoJackson, supra note 64, at 31 (noting that "the conditions for taking evi-
dence are particularly poor in the case of international crimes"); supra note
159 and related text.
362. While all the domestic examples listed supra are limited to in-person
recantation by witnesses who are available for cross-examination, the ICC
rule applies equally to statements of persons who fail to attend trial. ICC
RPE, Rule 68(2)(d)(i), ICC-PIDS-LT-02-002/13_Eng (2013).
363. See Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44, § 116(4) (Eng.) (permitting the
admission of the written statements of fearful witnesses "if the court consid-
ers that the statement ought to be admitted in the interests of justice" and
providing four factors the court should take into account in making such a
ruling including "any risk that its admission or exclusion will result in unfair-
ness to any party to the proceedings (and in particular to how difficult it will
be to challenge the statement if the relevant person does not give oral evi-
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fact, when the ECHR's Grand Chamber recently considered
this U.K approach, its analysis included a comparative assess-
ment of six other common law jurisdictions, none of which
employed similar legislation. 364 Moreover, two of the jurisdic-
tions surveyed considered and rejected the U.K approach,
with one concluding that it allows in "unreliable hearsay evi-
dence"3 65 and the other declaring the Act's main provisions
on hearsay incompatible with the right of confrontation.3 6 6 In
addition, the U.K law has been criticized as applied for plac-
ing undue weight on "the public interest in prosecuting cases
when witnesses are absent," 3 6 7 "a practical approach to the ad-
mission of unavailable witness evidence [ ] that complements
the statutory regime but . .. risks fair trial rights."3 68 In other
words, the closest domestic parallel to 68(2) (d) is not only ex-
ceptional but controversial.
In addition, inasmuch as U.K appellate decisions impose
additional safeguards on the admission of statements taken
from fearful witnesses, these measures are not required by
68(2) (d), nor does it seem likely that the ICC will introduce
them. For example, U.K courts oblige the prosecution to
make "very full inquiries" regarding an unavailable witness's
credibility as a prerequisite to admitting her written state-
dence)"). Scottish Law has a similarly broad approach to hearsay and would
likewise permit the admission of prior statements, although it makes no ref-
erence to fear or recantation. See Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
§259 (2) (e).
364. Al-Khawaja v. United Kingdom, 54 Eur. Ct. H.R. 23, ¶[ 69-87 (2012)
(comparing the United Kingdom approach to that of Ireland, Australia, Ca-
nada, Hong Kong, New Zealand and the United States).
365. Id. 1 81 (quoting a report from Hong Kong's Law Reform Commis-
sion).
366. Id. 1 71. Ireland's Law Reform Commission explained that it could
not follow the United Kingdom approach because "to allow in untested evi-
dence from frightened and unavailable witnesses would undermine [the
right of confrontation]." LAw REFORM COMM'N, CONSULTATION PAPER: HEAR-
SAY IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 163 (2010) (describing section 114 as a
reform that relaxes the hearsay rule to such an extent as "to potentially
render [it] redundant").
367. Requa, supra note 346, at 220.
368. Id. at 226. See also Mark S. Brodin, The British Experience with Hearsay
Reform: A Cautionary Tale, 84 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1417, 1422-23 (2016) (criti-
cally assessing England's revised laws on documentary evidence of unavaila-
ble witnesses through an American lens).
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ment,3 69 something that the ICC Prosecution has acknowl-
edged it often cannot do.3 70 In addition, U.K. appellate case
law dictates that witnesses should not be told that their state-
ments may be read at trial, nor "given any indication whatso-
ever that this is likely,"3 7 1 a prerequisite that, given the Court's
increasing dependence on written testimony, seems ill-suited
to ICC replication. Finally, appellate jurisprudence emphasizes
the exceptional nature of the United Kingdom's provision gov-
erning the admission of statements by fearful witnesses, declar-
ing that when the content of the statement can really only be
assessed by in-person testimony, "as will often be the case, it may
not be admitted." 372 While this article advocates for just such a
comparably rigorous (and consequently narrow) approach to
admitting statements pursuant to Rule 68(2) (d), one must an-
ticipate resistance to this view, particularly because it would
likely be equated with stripping the provision of its utility.3 73
C. Relevant ICC Practice
The only application of 68(2) (d) to date makes no refer-
ence to the exceptional nature of the provision, nor does it
consider any other factors analogous to the safeguards im-
posed by U.K. courts. On the contrary, the Trial Chamber's
ruling in Ruto & Sang rejected only one of the prosecution's
requests to admit 68(2) (d) evidence,3 7 4 while admitting four
369. Regina v. Riat [2012] EWCA (Crim) 1509, 1 18.
370. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
371. Regina v. Horncastle [2010] 2 AC 373, ¶ 88.
372. Id.
373. For example, the Ruto Trial Chamber rejected the suggestion that
Rule 68(2) (d) statements should be sworn because this requirement would
"severely limit the practical application of the amended Rule 68" and "would
thus be against the object and purpose of the amended Rule 68, which, in a
manner which respects the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings,
facilitates the introduction of prior recorded testimony in situations where
oral in-court testimony cannot be given as anticipated." Prosecutor v. Ruto,
Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on Prosecution Request for Admission
of Prior Recorded Testimony, 1 32 (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/
CourtRecords/CR2015_15400.PDF. Similarly, the WGLL concluded that it
would be "unduly restrictive to limit the applicability" of the sub-rule to in-
stances wherein the accused was responsible for the interference. Study
Group on Governance, Second Rep., supra note 232, 1 34.
374. Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on Prosecu-
tion Request for Admission of Prior Recorded Testimony, ¶J 96-97 (Aug.
19, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_15400.PDF (at-
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other statements and associated documents under the rule.3 75
Moreover, at least one of the admitted statements-all of
which were tied to recanting witnesses-was given by a person
who later stated under oath that he did not anticipate being
called to testify when he provided the statement.376 In sum,
the ICC's first application of 68(2) (d) appears decidedly less
rights-protective than that of its ostensible domestic counter-
part, a point worth noting even though the statements were
ultimately excluded on appeal.377 Indeed, because this later
reversal was based solely on the retroactive application of
68(2) (d) and because it did not consider any other aspect of
the rule's application,378 the Trial Chamber decision retains its
value as potential (non-binding) precedent for future applica-
tions of the rule.
In this respect, one of the most striking aspects of the
Trial Chamber decision lies in its selective consideration of
tributing the rejection to insufficient evidence of witness interference, a pre-
requisite for admission).
375. Id. 11 67, 86, 117, 133.
376. Id. ¶ 63 (citing the submission of the Ruto defense).
377. Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11-2024, Judgment on
the Appeals of Mr. William Samoei Ruto and Mr. Joshua Arap Sang Against
the Decision of Trial Chamber V(A) of 19 August 2015 Entitled "Decision on
Prosecution Request for Admission of Prior Recorded Testimony," (Feb. 12,
2016); see also Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 51(4) (prohibiting rule
amendments from applying retroactively "to the detriment of the person
who is being investigated or prosecuted"). Accordingly, the lower court's
analysis regarding other application matters remains relevant regarding the
potential future application of the sub-rule.
378. Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11-2024, Judgment on
the Appeals of Mr. William Samoei Ruto and Mr. Joshua Arap Sang Against
the Decision of Trial Chamber V(A) of 19 August 2015 Entitled "Decision on
Prosecution Request for Admission of Prior Recorded Testimony," 11 94-95
(Feb. 12, 2016) (acknowledging "the negative impact that depriving the ac-
cused of the opportunity to challenge evidence can have on the fairness of
the proceedings" and concluding that the accused were disadvantaged in
this regard by the application of the new rule). In fact, the appellate decision
specifically eschews any discussion of the defense challenges to the lower
court's reliability and interests of justice assessments. Id. ¶¶ 9(vi)-(vii), 97.
This form of decision-making is what Cass Sunstein describes as "decisional
minimalism." Cass Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REv. 6,
6-7 (1996).
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ICTY precedent.379 For example, the Chamber turned to the
Tribunal's approach under 92 quater80 (the closest analogue
to Rule 68(2) (d)) to support its conclusion that the rule's reli-
ability requirement can be met by a particularly modest show-
ing.3 8 1 Simultaneously, however, the Trial Chamber ignored
an important point made by the same Tribunal source in con-
junction with this low reliability threshold: that there is a need
for "cautious scrutiny" before admitting the statement of an
unavailable witness that directly implicates the accused.38 2
Rather, and at marked odds with the 92 quater case law dis-
cussed above,383 the ICC decision cites neither corroboration
nor any other alternative guarantee of reliability in support of
its decision to admit the statements-although all four ad-
dressed the acts and conduct charged.38 4 In fact, the Trial
Chamber's interest of justice assessment gives almost no con-
sideration to the effect that the statements' admission may
have on the rights of the accused.385 Instead, the ruling fo-
379. Although 92 quinuqies was never applied, analogical value can be
drawn from the Tribunal's consideration of its other provision governing the
documentary evidence of unavailable witnesses, 92 quater.
380. Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on Prosecu-
tion Request for Admission of Prior Recorded Testimony, ¶ 65, n.100 (Aug.
19, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015-15400.PDF (cit-
ing Prosecutor v. Lukic, Case No. IT-98-32/1-A, Appeals Judgement, ¶ 566
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 4, 2012)).
381. Id. ¶ 65 (declaring that "the Chamber may consider the fact that a
statement was signed and is accompanied by a declaration that it is true to
the best of the witness's knowledge as an indicia of reliability").
382. Prosecutor v. Lukic, Case No. IT-98-32/1-A, Appeals Judgement, ¶
565, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 4, 2012).
383. See supra notes 291-294 and accompanying text.
384. See ICC RPE, Rule 68 (2) (d) (iv), ICC-PIDS-LT-02-002/13_Eng (2013)
(expressly providing that this may be a factor against introduction).
385. The Chamber does (unconvincingly) contend that admitting the di-
rectly incriminating statements over the strident objections of both accused
advances their right to be tried without undue delay. Prosecutor v. Ruto,
Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on Prosecution Request for Admission
of Prior Recorded Testimony, ¶ 60 (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/
CourtRecords/CR2015_15400.PDF (maintaining that this is consistent with
the rule's purpose of expediting proceedings). The decision also makes pass-
ing reference to the fact that both accused had the opportunity to "cross-
examine" the witnesses. Id. In so doing, however, it omits the fact that the
witnesses recanted their prior statements when called by the prosecution. As
the Appeals Chamber later observed, in such cases "it cannot be expected
that the accused would proceed by eliciting incriminating evidence from the
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cuses primarily on the need to safeguard the trial from inter-
ruption due to the witness interference,386 while dismissing
the relevance of "the unproven link between the improper in-
terference and the accused" to its interests of justice determi-
nation.387 Simultaneously, the decision appears to downplay
the importance of its (required) interests of justice assess-
ment 8 by noting that, in the Chamber's ultimate assessment
of guilt or innocence, "whether the prior recorded testimonies
go to the acts and conduct of the accused, and whether the
evidence contained therein is corroborated" can affect the
weight the statements are ultimately given.389
D. Summary
By adopting 92 quinquies, the ICTY attempted to address
the frustrating and significant problem of witness interference
in international criminal trials. While a laudable and impor-
tant goal, the new provision further entrenched the prospect
of introducing critical, unexamined, party-generated state-
ments into the Tribunal's decidedly adversarial proceedings.
Additionally, the provision resulted solely in costs to the Tribu-
nal, as it engendered strident criticism about the institution's
witness in order to be able subsequently to challenge that evidence." Id. ¶
93.
386. Id. ¶ 60 ("The Chamber will not allow such hindrance and will safe-
guard the integrity of the proceedings."). New Zealand case-law points out
the dangers of this approach: "We would be on a slippery slope as a society if
on a supposed balancing of the interests of the State against those of the
individual accused the courts were by judicial rule to allow limitations on the
defence in raising matters properly relevant to an issue in the trial." R v.
Hughes [1986] 2 NZLR 129 (CA) at 148-49 (J. Richardson).
387. Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on Prosecu-
tion Request for Admission of Prior Recorded Testimony, 1 60 (Aug. 19,
2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_15400.PDF (main-
taining that "the Chamber does not consider that [the statements'] admis-
sion is unduly detrimental to the accused").
388. A Rule 68(2) (d) statement "may only be introduced if the Chamber
is satisfied that the interests of justice are best served" by its admission. ICC
RPE, Rule 68 (2) (d) (i), ICC-PIDS-LT-02-002/13_Eng (2013).
389. Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on Prosecu-
tion Request for Admission of Prior Recorded Testimony, 1 60 (Aug. 19,
2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_15400.PDF (main-
taining that "the Chamber does not consider that [the statements'] admis-
sion is unduly detrimental to the accused").
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commitment to truth-seeking and due process, all without ever
having been put to effective use.
Now a part of the Court's framework as 68(2) (d), the im-
ported rule will likely exact similar reputational costs if its sole
application to date provides any benchmark. In this respect,
one must hope that the Court's lone ruling is anomalous. At a
minimum, future applications of the rule should draw compre-
hensively, and not selectively, from the ICTY's analogous 92
quater case law. This means recognizing that the non-exacting
"indicia of reliability" assessment is a necessary but insufficient
precondition to admission. It also means that any interest of
justice assessment must meaningfully consider the effect of the
statement's admission on the rights of the accused in all cases
but most particularly when the proposed statement directly
implicates the accused in the crimes charged. Indeed, in such
cases, nothing short of cautious scrutiny will suffice if the
Court is to be seen as fair and its verdicts as reliable.
IX. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, one of the more remarkable and frustrating
aspects of the development of international criminal justice is
its tendency to recreate past mistakes rather than fully learn
from them. This is patently true of the use of witness state-
ments in international criminal trials. While the use of affidavit
evidence made the post-WWII proceedings more efficient, the
practice nevertheless left a stain on the legacy of Nuremburg,
and continues to contribute meaningfully to the widespread
perception that the Tokyo proceedings were unfair. Armed
with this information, the judges of the ICTY initially made an
affirmative decision to chart a different course as part of a
broader, acknowledged effort to "make good the flaws"390 of
Nuremberg and Tokyo.
The ICTY first considered the use of written evidence in a
way that demonstrated a noticeable commitment to securing a
rights-protective regime that took the ICTY's adversarial orien-
tation into meaningful account. Eventually, however, the Tri-
bunal succumbed to the seductive appeal of efficiency over
fairness and ought to be remembered for having made that
choice. Indeed, as this work illustrates, the final ICTY tem-
390. Statement by the ICTY President, supra note 57.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
[Vol. 50:75154
PROBLEM OF WITNESS STATEMENTS
plate, now transplanted into the ICC, was not the product of a
thoughtful and comprehensive plan. Instead, the now mim-
icked provisions were adopted in an ad hoc fashion, often in
response to a then-pressing problem, always in conjunction
with significant pressure to expedite ICTY proceedings, and
with increasingly less attention paid to their effect on the Tri-
bunal's obligation to secure a fair trial. These facts, coupled
with the unresolved question of whether its piecemeal ap-
proach actually made ICTY proceedings more efficient, sug-
gest that the Tribunal's written evidence experiment might
better contribute to the development of international criminal
practice from a "lessons learned" perspective than as an off-
the-shelf tool for future proceedings.
This "lessons learned" analysis would have revealed what
this article makes plain: the Tribunal's adversarial construct-
mirrored in the ICC in every way that matters-is one of the
primary reasons why the ICTY rules governing witness state-
ments proved both unfair and inefficient. Within such a
framework, it is to be expected that both parties, including the
prosecution, will proffer evidence that puts the "best gloss" on
their respective positions, and that they will take advantage of
every opportunity to "pile up" this evidence to strengthen its
persuasive power. The former fact explains why the right of
confrontation is a "central and defining feature" of adversarial
systems391 and why it is critical that fact-finders be able to ob-
serve the credibility and demeanor of partisan witnesses. Yet,
under the ICTY's eventual approach, both fundamental safe-
guards gave way to ostensibly more efficient written evidence.
Simultaneously, the ICTY rules gave the judges the power
to manage the use of witness statements but without the neces-
sary information to do so knowledgeably. Unlike their Conti-
nental counterparts, the Tribunal's judges did not have a com-
prehensive, objective dossier upon which to make well-in-
formed decisions on key issues-such as whether a proposed
statement was central to establishing the guilt of the accused
or whether a statement directly implicating the accused in the
crimes charged was cumulative evidence. As a result, Cham-
bers were frequently confronted with a series of unhappy, vary-
ingly inefficient alternatives in making their admissibility de-
391. David Lusty, Anonymous Accusers: An Historical & Comparative Analysis
of Secret Witnesses in Criminal Trials, 24 SYDNEY L. REv. 361, 375 (2002).
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terminations: rely upon the representations of the partisan
proponent (running the risk of reversal, as in Martic);392 scour
the available, party-proffered materials to formulate its own
conclusions (a time-consuming endeavor based on likely in-
complete information); tentatively admit the evidence after
motions and arguments, with the possibility of excluding it
later; or err on the side of caution and require the witness's
presence for cross-examination. In other words, the Tribunal's
adversarial construct hindered the judges' ability to efficiently
implement rules specifically geared towards expedition.
Had this type of stocktaking of the ICTY rules occurred
prior to the November 2013 amendments, perhaps the ICC
judges and the major stakeholders with whom they consulted
would not have proposed to replace the Court's more rights-
protective, truth-enhancing approach with the Tribunal's du-
bious template. Instead, the judges could have explored ways
to improve upon the ICTY approach, bearing in mind the par-
tisan nature of evidence-gathering and presentation decidedly
present in ICC practice. That the matter appears insufficiently
examined, particularly in light of then-existing criticisms of
the ICTY rules, raises serious questions about the process that
brought the 2013 amendments about. Nevertheless, the fact
remains that the rules have become a part of the Court's
framework. As a result, the focus must now be on implementa-
tion, as the Court's "emerging body of trial practices must be
regularly scrutinized to assure fundamental fairness."393
This Article marks the beginning of that undertaking and
its assessment of the Court's first efforts to apply revised Rule
68 shows cause for concern. Indeed, only one of the ICC deci-
sions surveyed includes any meaningful consideration regard-
ing how the admission of the proposed statements might affect
the rights of the accused. Moreover, while the Rule 68(2) (b)
decision in Gbagbo demonstrates the need for judges to care-
fully vet an adversarial party's characterization of its own evi-
dence-and the commitment of one Chamber to engage in
this time-consuming exercise-there is no assurance that fu-
ture Trial Chambers will follow suit. If anything, there is rea-
392. Case No. IT-95-11-A, Judgement (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yu-
goslavia Oct. 8, 2008). Martic is discussed supra Part V.
393. Wald, supra note 12, at 537 (discussing the need to vet the processes
employed by international courts).
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son to suspect that this type of laborious, rights-protective as-
sessment may fall by the wayside as efficiency and budgetary
pressures increase.
More troubling still is the nonchalant manner in which
two separate ICC Trial Chambers recently admitted directly in-
criminating statements of unavailable witnesses without any
apparent regard for safeguards well-entrenched in Tribunal
precedent. 394 Unless closer attention is paid to this developing
body of law, the absence of "bottom-line norms of reliability
for judge-factfinders in international trials"3 9 5 may become
customary, to the detriment of both the accused and the
Court. A standard-less approach would simultaneously incen-
tivize the introduction of "evidential debris," 39 6 while eliminat-
ing the impetus for seeking out fairness-enhancing alterna-
tives, including the prospect of providing confrontation
outside the trial context.
As a relatively young institution, the ICC finds itself in the
delicate position of needing to establish its legitimacy.397 Un-
doubtedly, the ability to complete its trials and produce con-
victions are a key part of this endeavor. Yet, convictions ren-
dered under less than fair conditions are almost certain to
raise questions about their reliability, undermining any posi-
tive perceptions engendered by apparent effectiveness. Moreo-
ver, at least part of the affected communities is likely to view
the proceedings as rigged, weakening the Court's legitimacy in
394. See Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision on
Prosecution Application Under Rule 68(2) (c) of the Rules for Admission of
Prior Recorded Testimony of P-0022, P-0041 and P-0103 (Nov. 20, 2015),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_22692.PDF; Prosecutor v.
Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on Prosecution Request for Ad-
mission of Prior Recorded Testimony, 1 94-95 (Aug. 19, 2015), https://
www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_15400.PDF.
395. Wald, Rules of Evidence, supra note 146, at 770.
396. Murphy & Baddour, supra note 199, at 369.
397. Mirjan Damaska, Assignment of Counsel and Perceptions of Fairness, 3 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 3, 4 (2005) (noting that it is important for "[a]n adolescent
justice system ... with still fragile legitimacy" to be perceived as fair); see also
Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, The Dichotomy Between judicial Economy and
Equality of Arms Within International and Internationalized Criminal Trials: A De-
fense Perspective, 28 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1566, 1566 (2005) (observing that
"the legal-political environment in which international and internationalized
criminal courts function brings greater attention to the credibility of these
institutions" and that they must work to maintain credibility and integrity).
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certain regions and potentially engendering further hostility,
rather than contributing to the peace and security critical to
rebuilding post-conflict societies. Indeed, even those who sup-
port the convictions are liable to feel cheated by a process that
renders document-based convictions and thereby subordinates
the sharing of individual and collective harms.
Ultimately, any short-term gains associated with more effi-
cient and more attainable convictions-assuming these goals
can be achieved-must be assessed against longer term losses.
Like the ICTY before it, the ICC is meant to provide enlight-
ened justice,398 setting an example worthy of imitation on the
international and domestic level. Its leading role in the cur-
rent constellation of contemporary international criminal jus-
tice institutions leaves the ICC uniquely poised to either solid-
ify the human rights advancements hard-won over the last
seven decades, or lead a retreat away from prioritizing the pro-
cess accused persons are due. Perhaps if greater attention is
paid to the Court's use of revised Rule 68-and with the en-
couragement of procedural watchdogs-it is not too late for
the ICC to impose careful limits on the use of written testi-
mony in its pursuit of justice.
398. William A. Schabas, Sentencing by International TDibunals: A Human
Rights Approach, 7 DuKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 461, 516 (1997) (concluding that
the ICTY was "mandated to provide a model of enlightened justice").
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